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CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS AFTER NEW
MEXICO CATTLE GROWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF AGENCY
DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE CRITICAL HABITAT
JaredB. Fish*
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973 noting
that "the preservation of a species' habitat is essential to the
preservation of the species itself."' Congress recognized that habitat
loss is "the major cause for the extinction of species worldwide,"2
and required the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS" or "the
agency") to make a critical habitat designation (CHD) for threatened
or endangered species that is "essential to the conservation of the
species." 3 In no event may the agency delay designating critical
habitat for more than twelve months after listing a species as
threatened or endangered. 4 FWS has, however, consistently dragged
its feet in fulfilling this obligation. As of July 2010, out of 1,375
listed U.S. species, only 594 (43%) had CHDs in some portion of
their range.

* University of California, Berkeley School of Law. Juris Doctor expected,
May 2011. I would like to extend my appreciation to Professor Eric Biber, who
offered valuable comments and direction on earlier drafts.
1. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (D.
Ariz. 2003).
2. H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 5 (1975), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453,
9455.
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2006).
4. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii); 50 C.F.R. § 424.17(b)(2) (2009).
5. Eugene H. Buck, et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40185, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) IN THE 11ITH CONGRESS: CONFLICTING VALUES
AND DIFFICULT CHOICES 2 (2010).
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Before 2001, FWS's legal explanations for failing to designate
critical habitat had a poor success rate in court, ultimately compelling
meaningful, if delayed, CHDs.6 The agency put forth three main
rationales for not designating critical habitat: 1) they were not
prudent because designating habitat would not be beneficial to the
species;7 2) they were not determinable because scientific data was
not conclusive as to what habitat was essential for conservation;8 and
3) designating critical habitat was redundant because it would not add
meaningful species protections. 9 On this last point, the agency argued
that (a) the listed species already received comparable protections
resulting automatically from a species' listing and/or (b) other
regulatory safeguards existed. 10
Courts routinely rejected these arguments, referencing Congress'
clear command that FWS shall designate critical habitat except in
extreme circumstances." A 2001 Tenth Circuit decision, however,
gave the agency a new rationale for limiting CHDs: a more robust
economic analysis that has resulted in exaggerated costs,
underestimated
benefits,
and ultimately
smaller
habitat
designations.12 In New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Service,13 the court rejected FWS's refusal to consider the
economic impacts of designating critical habitat, as required by the
ESA. The agency argued that (a) designating critical habitat added no

6. See infra Part 11(b) - (d).
7. See infra Part 11(b); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1) (2009) ("A
designation of critical habitat is not prudent when... [either] (i) The species is
threatened by taking or other human activity, and identification of critical habitat
can be expected to increase the degree of such threat to the species, or (ii) Such
designation of critical habitat would not be beneficial to the species.").
8. See infra Part 11(c); 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(2) (2009) ("Critical habitat is not
determinable when one or both of the following situations exist: (i) Information
sufficient to perform required analyses of the impacts of the designation is lacking,
or (ii) The biological needs of the species are not sufficiently well known to permit
identification of an area as critical habitat.").
9. See infra Part 11(d).
10. See, e.g., N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001).
11. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior ("The
Gnatcatcher Case"), 113 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Norton, 240 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1099 (D. Ariz. 2003); N. Spotted Owl v.
Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 626 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
12. See N.M. Cattle GrowersAss'n, 248 F.3d 1277 at 1280.
13. Id. at 1278.
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further protections beyond species listing, and therefore (b) the
economic impacts attributable solely to habitat designation were
negligible.14 Noting Congress' intent that the agency consider
"relevant impact[s]" of CHDs - including economic impacts - the
court for the first time required the agency to consider economic
impacts co-extensive with listing.
Beyond being inconsistent with the ESA's requirement that the
agency consider economic impacts attributable to a CHD only, the
New Mexico Cattle Growers ruling inadvertently handed the agency
an innovative means of not designating critical habitat. The timing
was serendipitous for a new administration that sought to tip the
balance in favor of private property rights and development
interests. 16 After the decision, FWS beefed up its economic analyses
to include all impacts associated with listing and habitat
designation.17 Partly because economic costs like stymied real estate
development are easier to measure than direct and ancillary benefits,
such as watershed protection, aesthetic values, and educational
opportunities, the new cost projections were politically alarming and
invited political pressure and prospects for increased litigation by
pro-development groups.
This paper argues that as a result of New Mexico Cattle Growers,
FWS's co-extensive economic impact analysis has become a vehicle
for excluding critical habitat and promoting unproven alternative
cooperative conservation initiatives, such as habitat conservation
plans (HCPs). These alternatives, however, do not afford species the
14. Id. at 1283-84.
15. Id at 1282; 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2006).
16. See, e.g., Michael Senatore, et al., Critical Habitat

at the Crossroads:

Responding to the G. W Bush Administration's Attacks on Critical Habitat
Designation Under the ESA, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 447, 462 (2003);
Douglas Jehl, Rare Arizona Owl (All 7 Inches of It) Is in Habitat Furor. N.Y.
TIMES, March 17, 2003, at Al; Jane Kay, California Frog Loses 4 Million
Protected Acres, S.F. CHRON., July 4, 2002, at A.1 ("From the outset, the Bush
administration has made no secret of its misgivings about the critical habitat
process, saying that the designations -- particularly when required under court order
-- divert the Fish and Wildlife Service from the more important task of determining
which species deserve federal protection.").
17. See, e.g., Janet Wilson, HabitatsMay Shrink by Leaps, Bounds, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2005 at Al.
18. See Amanda R. Garcia, Student Article, The Sage Grouse Debate: Cost-

Benefit Analysis and the Discourse of the Endangered Species Act, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 572 (2006).
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same protections, are unproven, have poor implementation records,
and are inconsistent with the ESA's mandate that FWS designate
critical habitat.1 9
Courts have granted the agency broad deference to exclude habitat
under § 1533(b)(2), at odds with previous rulings where courts took a
"hard look" at the agency's refusal to designate critical habitat in the
first place under ESA § 1533(a)(3). 20 In other words, FWS is doing
on the back end at Step 2 (excluding critical habitat from proposed
designations) what courts prohibited on the front end at Step 1
(delaying or simply not designating critical habitat at all because it
was not prudent, not determinable, or redundant).2 1 Instead of
refusing to designate critical habitat in the first place, the agency cites
high economic costs and alternative protections as reasons to exclude
critical habitat after the initial designation.2 2
Part II of this paper explains the role of critical habitat designations
in promoting the recovery of listed species. Part III analyzes FWS's
19. Martin F.J. Taylor, et al., The Effectiveness of the EndangeredSpecies Act:
A Quantitative Analysis, BIOSCIENCE, Apr. 2005 at 364-65.
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)-(b)(2) (2006). The "hard look" test refers to a
probing level of judicial review for agency rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Under this doctrine, first adopted in Motor Vehicle Mfrs'
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1983), the Court
closely scrutinizes the logical and factual bases for the decisions made. The Court
therefore grants limited deference to the agency's decision, looking closely at
whether the agency has thoroughly analyzed the relevant evidence and policy
alternatives, on which it has come to a reasoned decision. See Harold Leventhal,
Environmental Decision-making and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
509, 511 (1974). Although the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency, the Court's review must nevertheless be "searching and careful." Marsh v.
Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
21. See, e.g., N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001).
22. See, e.g., Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the California RedLegged Frog (Rana aurora draytonii), 74 Fed. Reg. 51,825, 51,827 (proposed Oct.
8, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Revised Critical Habitat for the
California Red-Legged Frog (Rana aurora draytonii), 73 Fed. Reg. 53,492
(proposed Sept. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Designation of
Critical Habitat for the San Diego Fairy Shrimp (Branchinecta sandiegonensis), 72
Fed. Reg. 70,648, 70,663, 70688 (Dec. 12, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17); Designation of Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog, and
Special Rule Exemption Associated With Final Listing for Existing Routine
Ranching Activities, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,244 (April 13, 2006) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17); Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70 Fed. Reg.
56,212, 56,232, 56,240 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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main justifications for refusing to designate critical habitat, and how
those justifications routinely fail in court. Part IV looks at the impact
of the Tenth Circuit's decision in New Mexico Cattle Growers on
FWS's use of expanded, co-extensive economic impact analyses to
determine the costs and benefits of CHDs. Part V explains how the
agency quickly began using the new economic analyses to exclude
large tracts of critical habitat for several species. Part VI looks at how
the agency's routine exaggeration of costs and underestimation of
benefits have led the agency to essentially read Congress' goal of
species recovery out of the ESA. Finally, Part VII discusses a way
forward in both the courts and through congressional and agency
action to ensure that CHDs are designated in line with Congress'
overriding goal of achieving species conservation.
II. CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR SPECIES
RECOVERY AND ECOSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY

Critical habitat designations are central to recovering ESA listed
species. They provide important protections beyond those attributable
to a species' listing and attendant recovery plans, neither of which is
directly tethered to habitat protection. 23 Listing species only protects
individuals of species from harm, while recovery plans focus only on
site-specific impacts to individuals or small populations of a
species. 24
Critical habitat is defined in § 3 of the ESA as the specific areas
within a geographic region, either occupied or unoccupied by a
species, on which are found those physical or biological features
essential to the conservation of the species and that may require
special management consideration or protection. 25 "Conservation"
means the use of all methods and procedures that are necessary to
bring a listed species to the point at which listing under the ESA is no
longer necessary. 26 FWS must designate critical habitat based only on
the best scientific data available. 27 It must also, however, conduct an
impact analysis of the designation under § 4(b)(2), which takes into
account the "the economic impact, the impact on national security,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a), (f) (2006).
Id.
Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i), (ii).
Id. § 1532(3).
Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
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and any other relevant impact." 28 The agency may then exclude
portions of the CHD based on the impact analysis, if the benefits of
excluding those areas outweigh the benefits of including them, so
long as such exclusions will not result in the species' extinction.29
Critical habitat protections are triggered by § 7 of the ESA, which
requires consultations between FWS and the federal agency involved
in any activity on public lands - as well as for actions on private
lands with a federal nexus - that are likely to result in the destruction
or adverse modification of critical habitat.o Such consultations offer
a greater degree of protection than jeopardy consultations, or those
triggered by a species' listing. 3 1 A jeopardy analysis is limited to
determining whether the activity is likely to impact a species'
survival. 32 In addition, the scientific data developed in designating
CHDs helps to establish long-term recovery plans.3 3 CHIDs are
therefore key to implementing the ESA's recovery or conservation
objective, while also promoting ancillary ecological benefits
associated with preserving open space. As John Kostyack, senior
counsel for the National Wildlife Federation, stated in congressional
testimony in 2003, "critical habitat provisions are designed to protect
more than just the habitat occupied by the species in its depleted
state; they ensure that all habitats needed for recovery are taken into
account." 34
A 2005 BioScience study found a strong correlation between CHDs
and species recovery. 35 The authors tracked data from the
government's biannual reports listing species as declining, stable, or
recovering over the period 1990 to 2002.36 Species with critical
habitat for two or more years were more likely to enjoy increasing
numbers and were less likely to experience decline than those without
28. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl, 60 Fed.
Reg. 29,914, 29,917 (June 6, 1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
34. CriticalHabitatDesignations Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Hearings
Before the US. S. Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water, 108th Cong. 62
(2003) (statement of John Kostyack, Senior Counsel, National Wildlife
Federation).
35. See Taylor, supra note 19, at 366.
36. Id. at 360.
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CHDs.37 In addition, species with critical habitat for two or more
years were less than half as likely to be declining in the early period
of the study, and were more than twice as likely to be improving in
the late stage, compared to species without CHDs. 3 8 While it is true
that only a little more than a dozen of roughly 1300 listed species
have achieved recovery since 1973, it is also true that only one-third
of listed species have received CHDs. 39 Considering that it may take
several years or decades to recover a listed species, the BioScience
data showing improvement, if not full recovery, associated with
CHDs favors the inference that critical habitat is important to
eventual recovery. As FWS itself noted in designating critical habitat
for the Mexican spotted owl:
[C]ritical habitat serves to preserve options for a species'
eventual recovery. .[It] helps focus conservation activities
by identifying areas that contain essential habitat features
(primary constituent elements) regardless of whether or not
they are currently occupied by the listed species, thus
alerting the public to the importance of an area in the
conservation of a listed species 40
The BioScience study also found dedicated recovery plans
important to species conservation, but not exclusive of CHDs. The
ESA requires FWS to develop site-specific recovery actions under §
4(f)(1), in addition to designating critical habitat. 4 1 FWS data shows
that, by 2004, only two percent of FWS-administered species had
achieved more than seventy-five percent of their recovery objectives
through recovery plans; thus indicating the continued importance of
CHDs. 42 Compliance with the ESA also requires both CHDs and
recovery plans. 43 Indeed, by including both sections in the ESA, and
in no way indicating their mutual exclusivity, Congress gave every

37. Id. at 362.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 360.
40. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl, 60 Fed.
Reg. 29,914, 29,917 (June 6, 1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).

41. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3), (f)(1) (2006).
42. Taylor, supra note 19, at 364.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3), (f)(1) (2006).
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indication that it did not intend for FWS to use alternative
conservation strategies, such as HCPs, as substitutes for CHDs."
That said, Congress did include HCPs in the 1982 ESA
amendments, but only as part of a compromise that loosened the
ESA's § 9 strict prohibition on the "taking" - killing or otherwise
harming - of species and not as a substitute for CHDs.4 5 Under § 10,
a landowner may apply for an incidental take permit (ITP), which
provides an exception to the take prohibition where landowners
engage in otherwise lawful activities.46 Approval of the permit is
contingent on the landowner developing an HCP that will mitigate
the impacts of the take and not "appreciably reduce the likelihood of
the survival and recovery of the species in the wild."4 7 As is
discussed in more detail in Part V(b), 4 8 however, HCPs and other
"cooperative conservation" strategies have, at best, a mixed track
record of promoting species recovery.

III. FWS's RATIONALES

FOR NOT DESIGNATING CRITICAL HABITAT
ROUTINELY FAIL IN COURT

A. StandardOfReview
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 4 9 a reviewing
court must set aside agency actions found to be "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law."50 This is a "deferential standard ... designed to ensure that the
agency considered all of the relevant factors and that its decision
contained no clear error of judgment." 1 The court must ask whether
the agency "articulated a rational connection between the facts found

44. See The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he
Natural Community Conservation Plan alternative cannot be viewed as a functional
substitute for critical habitat designation.... The NCCP alternative ... is a purely
voluntary program that applies only to non-federal land-use activities.").
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006) (explaining "take" means to "harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" a listed species).
46. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
47. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
48. See infra Part V(b).
49. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006).
50. Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 265 F .3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).
51. Id.
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and the choice made." 52 Where a statute's language and purpose are
clear, agency discretion is most directly constrained under the
familiar Chevron framework, whereby "the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." 5 3 In the case of the ESA, courts must closely scrutinize
agency decision-making - to a greater degree than for other
environmental statutes - because Congress' clear and overriding
intent was to conserve the ecosystems essential for the recovery of
threatened and endangered species. 54 "When Congress has a clear
intent, the court must give effect to that intent as law."5 s The
following sections detail how courts have consistently honored this
clear intent when hearing challenges to FWS's refusal to designate
critical habitat under § 4(a)(3).
B. Not PrudentRationale

Courts have consistently rejected FWS's "not prudent" justification
for failing to designate critical habitat by employing an intrusive level
of judicial review.56 A CHD is "not prudent" when the following
exists: (a) identifying critical habitat will increase the threat of taking

52. The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1997).
53. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b) (1988). In creating the ESA, "Congress started from the
finding that '[t]he two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of
natural habitat."' TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93307, p. 2 (1973), reprintedin 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2289, 2290).
In addition, Congress passed the ESA with the stated purpose "'to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved,' and 'to provide a program for the conservation of such .
species. . . .' Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)).
55. Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229,
1236 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) ("[W]hile reviewing courts should uphold
reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency's enabling act, they must not
'rubber-stamp ... administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a
statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.");
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125 n.5 (S.D.
Cal. 2006) (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051,
1059-60 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
56. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d at 1125; Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of
Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 905-06 (D.D.C. 1997).
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of the species, or (b) such a designation would not be beneficial to the
57
species.
When the agency makes a "not prudent" finding, courts examine
the agency's record to determine whether it (a) fully considered the
benefits of designating critical habitat and (b) whether its balancing
of a designation's benefits and adverse consequences are rationally
connected to the evidence in the record. 58 Courts give the agency
little deference in balancing factors, considering Congress' clear
command that the agency "shall" designate critical habitat to the
"maximum extent prudent" as the linchpin of achieving species
conservation and recovery. 59 This level of intrusive analysis is
consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in State Farm, where
the Court found that the agency failed to draw a rational connection
between the evidence available and its rulemaking concerning the
public safety benefits of passive restraint seatbelts. 60 In all cases that
reached trial - spanning nearly two decades from 1991 through 2009
- where the question centered on whether the "not prudent"
justification was valid, the agency lost, thereby compelling FWS to
designate critical habitat.61 Where disputes did not reach trial, the
agency often settled with environmental plaintiffs and designated
critical habitat. 6 2
Several cases illustrate courts' routine willingness to limit agency
discretion by rejecting FWS's failure to fully consider benefits of

57. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (1996).
58. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d at 1125-26; Bldg. Indus. Ass'n,
979 F. Supp. at 905-06.
59. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. at 905.
60. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insur. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
61. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121; Conner v. Burford, 848
F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
422 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Jumping Frog Research Inst. v. Babbitt,
No. C 99-01461 WHA, 1999 WL 1244149 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 1999); Bldg. Indus.
Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. 893.
62. For example, in a settlement negotiation with the Center for Biological
Diversity, FWS agreed to withdraw its "not prudent" determination for the
Alameda Whipsnake and designate critical habitat. It promulgated a final rule for a
CHD on October 3, 2000. Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the Alameda
Whipsnake (Masticophis lateralis euryxanthus), 65 Fed. Reg. 58,933 (Oct. 3, 2000)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 2003).
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CHDs. 63 The California red-legged frog is a high-profile example.
Since it was first listed as threatened in 1996, the frog has lost more
than seventy percent of its historic habitat to development. 6 The
frog's listing triggered a mandatory CHD by FWS,65 but the agency
refused to designate habitat for two reasons. First, it argued that it
was "not prudent" because a CHD would reveal precise locations of
the frog and therefore render it vulnerable to vandalism and taking.66
Second, it argued that because most of the designated habitat
occurred on private land, such a designation would not benefit the
frog because private land was not likely to be subject to § 7
67
discussed in Part I, the core force
As dicse
consultation requirements.
behind a CHD is the § 7 consultation process, which prevents
projects with a federal nexus that adversely impact a species' critical
habitat. 68 The agency balanced these two considerations against the
fact that preserving open space and riparian areas was a "fundamental
requirement in the survival and recovery of the California red-legged
frog." 69 Finding that the former outweighed the latter, it concluded
70
that a designation would provide "no benefit" to the frog.
Similarly, the agency refused to designate critical habitat for four
vernal pool species and the California gnatcatcher because it
concluded that the risk of vandalism outweighed the benefits to the
species. 7 The agency cited to one instance of intentional vandalism
to the vernal pool species' habitat, 72 and eleven instances of

63. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121; Burford, 848 F.2d 1441;
Ctr.for BiologicalDiversity, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115; The Jumping Frog Case, 1999
WL 1244149; Bldg. Indus. Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. 893.
64. Wilson, supra note 17.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
66. Determination of Threatened Status for the California Red-Legged Frog, 61
Fed. Reg. 25,813, 25,822 (May 23, 1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
67. Id.
68. See supra Part I.
69. Determination of Threatened Status for the California Red-Legged Frog, 61
Fed. Reg. at 25,830.
70. Id.
71. The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1997); Bldg. Indus.
Ass'n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 896-97, 905 (D.D.C 1997).
72. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. at 906 (citing Memorandum from FWS
Sacramento Field Office (July 3, 1991), A.R. at 1012).
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vandalism in the case of the gnatcatcher. 73 In yet another instance,
FWS refused to designate critical habitat for the jaguar in 2006, citing
studies suggesting that CHDs in Arizona and New Mexico were not
necessary for the species' survival.7 4
In all four cases, the courts struck down the agency's not prudent
findings for failing to fully consider benefits of CHDs and for failing
to overcome "the strong presumption that critical habitat will be
designated" in balancing benefits against adverse consequences of
designation.7 5 In Jumping Frog Institute v. Babbitt ("The Jumping
Frog Case"), a California district court found that, as a matter of law,
the agency needed to consider the benefits of § 7 federal consultation
requirements on public land. 76 The agency did not do so.77 Moreover,
the court rejected the agency's conclusion that the designation would
provide "no benefit" because most of the critical habitat occurred on
private land. Projects on private land with a federal nexus, such as
those requiring federal permitting, would be subject to § 7
consultations, so the agency could not rationally conclude that the
designation would provide no benefit. 79
Similarly, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.
Department of the Interior ("The Gnatcatcher Case"), the Ninth
Circuit faulted the agency for failing to fully consider the benefits of
a CHD to determine whether "the possible adverse consequences
would outweigh the benefits of designation."so And most recently, on
March 30, 2009, an Arizona district court in Centerfor Biological
Diversity v. Kempthorne ("The

considering

whether FWS

Jaguar Case") went beyond

sufficiently considered

benefits of

73. The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d at 1125 (citing Determination of
Threatened Status for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,753,
16,756 (March 30, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)).
74. Determination That Designation of Critical Habitat Is Not Prudent for the
Jaguar, 71 Fed. Reg. 39,335, 39,337 (July 12, 2006).
75. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. at 906 (citing N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758
F. Supp. 621, 626 (W.D. Wash. 1991)).
76. Jumping Frog Research Inst. v. Babbitt, No. C 99-01461 WHA, 1999 WL
1244149, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 1999).
77. Id.
7 8. Id.
79. Id.
80. 113 F.3d at 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Amended Procedures to
Comply With the 1982 Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, 49 Fed. Reg.
38,900, 38,903 (Oct. 1, 1984) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424) (emphasis
added)).
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designation by examining the scientific record itself.81 While
acknowledging that FWS relied on a study that "cautioned against
designating critical habitat at that time," the court found the report
unpersuasive because it was based on the conclusion that a CHD
would not benefit the survival of the species.82 As discussed in Part
3(c)(2), "[t]he designation of critical habitat is intended to promote
not only the survival but also the recovery of species."83 The court
cited sua sponte numerous other scientific studies supporting the
necessity of designating critical habitat for the jaguar to support its

recovery.84
The JaguarCase and The Gnatcatcher Case illustrate that, despite

courts' general deference to an agency's scientific expertise, in the
ESA context, courts are more willing to invoke the precautionary
principle due to Congress' clear conservation mandate. The agency
cannot "ignore available biological information," even if it found
that, in its judgment, the information only "may indicate potential
conflicts between development and the preservation of protected
species.,,8 5 As a California district court opined in 2006, "[t]o the
extent that there is any uncertainty as to what constitutes the best
available scientific information, Congress intended to 'give the
benefit of the doubt to the species."' 86 "To hold otherwise would
eviscerate Congress' intent to 'give the benefit of the doubt to the
species.'"
The second reason courts have struck down "not prudent"
determinations is because the agency used flawed reasoning in
balancing the benefits and adverse consequences of designating

81. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Kempthome, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 108990 (D. Ariz. 2009).
82. Id. at 1089.
83. Id. (citing Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378
F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that it "is logical and inevitable that a
species requires more critical habitat for recovery than is necessary for species
survival")).
84. Id. at 1090-91.
85. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
86. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1127
(quoting Burford, 848 F.2d at 1454).
87. Burford, 848 F.2d at 1454 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-697, at 12
(1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2576).
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critical habitat.8 8 In Building Industry Ass'n of Superior Cal. v.
Babbitt ("The Fairy Shrimp Case"), the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia found that the agency's reliance on one
instance of intentional vandalism could not rationally outweigh the
potential benefits of a designation to the vernal pool species'
recovery.89 Acknowledging that, where a determination "'requires a
high level of technical expertise [a court] must defer to the informed
discretion of the responsible federal agencies,"' 90 the court
nevertheless found that agency's conclusion to be fatally flawed. 91
Moreover, while the court did not quarrel with the agency's
determination that landowners would increase development ahead of
an announced designation, 92 it did fault the agency for failing to
support its assertion with sufficient evidence. 93
Even where the agency cited eleven instances of vandalism for the
California gnatcatcher, The Gnatcatcher Case court found this
evidence insufficient to rationally conclude that the 400,000-acre
CHD would either cause more landowners to destroy gnatcatcher
land or provide no benefit to the species. 94 As in The Fairy Shrimp
Case, the court leaned heavily on Congress' intent that "[i]t is only in
rare circumstances where the specification of critical habitat
concurrently with the listing would not be beneficial to the species." 95
88. See The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that FWS must weigh the benefits of designation against the risks of designation
before determining that, on balance, a CHD would increase the threat to the
species); see also Jumping Frog Research Inst. v. Babbitt, No. C 99-01461 WHA,
1999 WL 1244149, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 1999).
89. 979 F. Supp. 893, 905-06 (D.D.C. 1997); cf Fund for Animals v. Babbitt,
903 F. Supp. 96, 116-17 (D.D.C. 1995) (upholding FWS's determination that a
CHD for grizzly bears was not prudent because it was redundant and less beneficial
than comparable habitat protection agreements). The district court's reasoning in
Fundfor Animals is the exception to the rule, however, and was explicitly rejected
by the Ninth Circuit two years later in the GnatcatcherCase. That court found that,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, FWS may not refuse to designate critical
habitat because it would add protections less beneficial than those already in place.
The GnatcatcherCase, 113 F.3d at 1127.
90. The Fairy Shrimp Case, 979 F. Supp. at 898 (quoting Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Res. Def. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)).
91. Id. at 906.
92. Id.

93. Id.
94. The GnatcatcherCase, 113 F.3d at 1125.
95. Id. at 1126 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 17 (1978), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9467).
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FWS failed to articulate a "'rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made"' 96 under the APA. 97
Court orders rejecting "not prudent" determinations and mandating
CHDs have generally resulted in real - if protracted - agency action.

Following The Jumping Frog decision, the agency designated 4.1
million acres of critical habitat for the red-legged frog in March
2001.98 In September 2002, five years after The Fairy Shrimp
decision, FWS issued a proposed rule designating 1.7 million acres of
critical habitat for fifteen vernal pool species. 99 And in 2000, the
agency designated more than 500,000 acres as critical habitat for the
gnatcatcher.100 Finally, in January 2010, less than a year after its "not
prudent" finding for the jaguar was struck down, FWS issued a notice
of determination that a CHD for the jaguar is prudent. A proposed
designation is expected by January 2011.101
While acknowledging agency discretion to find CHDs "not
prudent" under certain circumstances, courts have consistently cited
Congress' overriding charge that FWS designate critical habitat to
achieve species recovery, taking a "hard look" at agency decisionmaking.
C. Not DeterminableRationale

FWS has also refused to designate critical habitat because it had
insufficient scientific data to make an appropriate designation.102 The
designation was therefore "not determinable" under the ESA.10 As
with "not prudent" arguments, courts routinely rejected this rationale
96. Id. (quoting Res. Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir.
1993)).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
98. Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the California Red-legged Frog,
66 Fed. Reg. 14,626 (March 13, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
99. Critical Habitat Designation for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and Eleven
Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 67 Fed. Reg. 59,884 (Sept.
24, 2002) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
100. Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the Coastal California
Gnatcatcher, 65 Fed. Reg. 63,680 (Oct. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17).
101. Determination That Designation of Critical Habitat Is Prudent for the
Jaguar, 75 Fed. Reg. 1741 (Jan. 13, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
102. E.g., Determination of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55
Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,118 (June 26, 1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
103. Id. at 26,124.
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as inadequate. Congress unequivocally directed the agency to
designate critical habitat whenever possible, some degree of scientific
uncertainty notwithstanding.104 As the Tenth Circuit opined in 1999,
"'shall' means shall,"'os and the ESA plainly requires that the
Secretary "shall," after no more than two years, "designat[e], to the
maximum extent prudent, [critical] habitat."l 06 In this way, the "not
determinable" escape valve constrains agency discretion even more
than the "not prudent" exception, because a "not determinable"
finding may only delay - rather than permanently halt - agency

action.
Perhaps the most contentious symbol of the ESA over the last two
decades has been the northern spotted owl, which has served both as
a rallying cry for those seeking to weaken CHDs and a vindication of
the ESA's core component for its supporters. The owl's population
declined precipitously in the 1980s due to aggressive deforestation in
the Pacific Northwest,1 07 and it was designated as threatened under
the ESA in 1990.1os The agency refused to designate critical habitat,
however, arguing that a CHD was "not determinable."' 09 The United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington sided
with conservation groups challenging the rule, noting Congress'
overriding conservation focus and the corresponding high threshold
for finding a CHD to be indeterminable.1 10 The court found the
agency had abused its discretion under § 706 of the APA," noting
that the agency failed to state what additional economic and
biological information was needed to make a CHD, or to describe in
detail what steps it had taken toward designating critical habitat.1 12
The court held that the agency's argument that it was working on
alternative conservation strategies to protect the spotted owl was
104. See, e.g., N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 629 (W.D. Wash.
1991).
105. Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 1186, n.13 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) (2006)).
107. Brad Knickerbocker, Northern Spotted Owl's Decline Revives Old
Concerns. THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 27, 2007, at 2.
108. Id.
109. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,124 (June
26, 1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
110. N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 629 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
112. N. Spotted Owl, 758 F. Supp. at 627-28.
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inadequate, asserting that those efforts "did not relieve the [Fish and
Wildlife] Service of its obligation under the ESA to designate critical
habitat to the maximum extent determinable."1 1 3 Consequently, FWS
designated 6.9 million acres as critical habitat for the Northern
spotted owl in January 1992.114
Courts similarly rejected FWS's "not determinable" rationales for
refusing to designate critical habitat for the spikedace (listed in
1986), loach minnows (listed in 1986), Mexican spotted owl (listed in
1993), and willow flycatcher (listed in 1995), among others.1 15 As
with the "not prudent" case law, in each case where the court struck
down a "not determinable" finding, FWS eventually designated
critical habitat after litigation and a court order.1 1 6
D. Redundant ProtectionsRationale

Finally, the agency justified not designating critical habitat on the
grounds that doing so added no additional protections for the
species. 117 The agency put forth two main arguments to this effect.
First, oftentimes other regulatory schemes already existed that
provided sufficient protections for the species. Second, designating
critical habitat was redundant because any action on public land, or
any action on private land with a federal nexus, would be subject to §
7 consultations to determine whether the species' survival would be
jeopardized.
1. Other Protections Already Exist
District courts within the Ninth Circuit have routinely rejected the
notion that adequate alternative protections absolve the agency of its
duty to designate critical habitat. In The Gnatcatcher Case,11 8 the
Ninth Circuit held that the agency does not have discretion under the

113. Id at 629.
114. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed.
Reg. 1796, 1809 (Jan. 15, 1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
115. Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered
Species Act: Habitat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REv. 209, 229-30 (2000).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997); Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (D. Ariz. 2003).
118. The GnatcatcherCase, 113 F.3d at 1121.
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ESA to determine whether or not to designate an area as critical
habitat once it deems the habitat to be essential to recovery. 1 9 The
court reasoned that to do so would be contrary to the ESA's purpose

and plain language.120
In that case, the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to FWS's
refusal to designate a tract of land deemed essential to the recovery of
the California gnatcatcher. 121 The agency argued that superior
protections already existed,122 but the court found that "[n]either the
[Endangered Species] Act nor the implementing regulations sanctions
nondesignation of habitat when designation would be merely less
beneficial to the species than another type of protection."' 2 3 The court
rejected the contention that (a) a CHD would "not appreciably benefit
the [gnatcatcher]" and (b) that a voluntary habitat conservation
program (HCP) could substitute for a CHD.1 24
A California district court came to the same determination in 2002,
when the agency sought a voluntary remand with vacatur of its CHD
for the California gnatcatcher and San Diego fairy shrimp. 125 The
agency asserted a vacatur was appropriate because an already
existing HCP afforded the gnatcatcher adequate protections in the
interim. 12 Citing NRDC v. US. Dep 't ofInterior,the court held that
while the HCP was a comprehensive and coordinated environmental
protection program, it was irrelevant to the fact that "as a matter of
law the critical habitat offers distinct protections required by the
ESA."l527

Similarly, in 2003, an Arizona district court struck down the
agency's rationale for reducing the Mexican spotted owl's CHD by

119. Id. at 1127.
120. See id; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1098
(stating that "[T]he legislative history of the ESA evidences Congress'
understanding that the preservation of a species' habitat is essential to the
preservation of the species itself.").
121. The GnatcatcherCase, 113 F.3d at 1121.
122. Id. at 1126.
123. Id. at 1127.
124. Id. at 1126-27.
125. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1136
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
126. Id. at 1155.
127. Id. at 1154 n.37.

2010]

CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS

593

8.9 million acres, from 13.5 to 4.6 million acres.128 FWS issued a rule
eliminating all protected habitat in lands managed by the National
Forest Service, arguing that the Forest Service's own land
management plans provided adequate protections. 129 A CHD,
therefore, would merely add additionalprotections.130 As a matter of
law, the court held that the agency had impermissibly read the words
"additional" and "adequate" into the statute.131 MoTover, the ESA's
overriding emphasis on conservation and recovery obliged the agency
to follow the precautionary principle and err on the side of more
protections, not fewer.132
In all cases where the legitimacy of the agency's additional or
redundant protections argument in refusing to designate areas of land
as critical habitat was at issue, the courts leaned on two factors: the
plain text of the ESA and Congress' overriding emphasis on
recovering species by protecting their habitat.133 If there was any
question as to the agency's discretion under § 4(a)(3), courts held that
the agencies should be guided by Congress' central purpose in
mandating CHDs: conservation and recovery.' 34
2. Jeopardy Analysis Is Redundant
Under § 7 of the ESA, any federal activity requires consultation
between an action agency' 3 and FWS to determine whether the
proposed activity will (a) jeopardize a listed species' survival and/or
(b) destroy or otherwise adversely modify a listed species' critical
habitat.136 A consultation is based on FWS's biological opinion,
which uses the best scientific and commercial data available to
determine the proposed action's likely impact. 137 Because the
128. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1091, 1102 (D.
Ariz. 2003).
129. Id. at 1093.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 1099.
132. Id. at 1098.
133. See id.; see also Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
378 F.3d 1059, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2004).
134. Id.
135. This is the agency that finances, permits, or otherwise contributes to the
action that may impact a listed species. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
168 (1997) (explaining the role of action agencies in the consultation process).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (2009).
137. 50 C.F.R. § 402.11-12 (2009).
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consultation requirement applies to any activity with a federal nexus,
a private landowner would be subject to a consultation if he required,
say, a Clean Water Act § 404 dredge and fill permit.' 38
As noted, § 7 consultations for CHDs provide significantly greater
protections than jeopardy consultations triggered by a species' listing
for three reasons. First, they focus on species recovery rather than
survival. Second, CHD consultations net important derivative
benefits, such as water quality and watershed protection, climate and
air quality control, persistence of other species higher and lower on
the food chain, plant diversity, cultural values, and overall ecosystem
integrity. 139 Finally, CHD consultations apply to areas that may not
be currently occupied by a listed species, while jeopardy
consultations do not. 140 This means that if an unoccupied area were
designated as critical habitat, then any activity on that land with a
federal nexus would be subject to an adverse modification analysis
under § 7.141
Despite the greater protections Congress attached to adverse
modification consultations, the agency conflated jeopardy and
adverse modification analyses in its implementing regulation, 50
C.F.R. § 402.02. This made it appear that the two conferred the same
degree of species protection, and, therefore, that CHDs are
redundant.142 The regulation defines "destruction or adverse
modification" as changes to the critical habitat that appreciably
diminish "the value of critical habitat for both the survival and
recovery of a listed species."l43 Because a species needs more habitat
for recovery than survival,144 the regulation focuses exclusively on
"survival."1 4 5 The agency's rule thus rationalizes its argument that
138. Id.
139. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11-13, Ctr. For
Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, No. CV 08 5546 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2008).
140. "Critical habitat may also include 'specific areas outside the geographical
area occupied by the species ... upon a determination by the Secretary that such
areas are essential for the conservation of the species."' Cape Hatteras Access Pres.
Alliance v. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 119 (D.D.C. 2004)
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2006)).
141. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(2006).
142. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1069 (9th Cir. 2004).
145. See id
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CHDs are redundant because § 7 adverse modification consultations
afford listed species no more protections than a jeopardy analysis.
Predictably, FWS dramatically reduced the number of new CHDs
immediately after finalizing the rule in 1986.146
The northern spotted owl illustrates the agency's redundancy
argument. After a Washington court rejected FWS's "not
determinable" justification for failing to designate critical habitat for
the owl, 147 FWS finally issued a CHD.148 Conservation groups
challenged the CHD, however, arguing that the agency's decision to
exclude millions of acres of critical habitat was based on an illegal
regulation, 50 CFR § 402.02, governing consultations. 149 The
plaintiffs asserted that the regulation was facially invalid because it
set the threshold for vetoing the proposed action at species "survival
and recovery" rather than "recovery."o5 0
Aside from rationalizing a refusal to designate areas as critical
habitat, the agency's regulation also justified its finding that CHDs
alone have negligible economic impacts. By equating protections
afforded to species by listing and CHDs, any action associated with
an adverse modification analysis (triggered by a CHD) would
necessarily be subsumed by a jeopardy analysis (triggered by a
species' listing). In other words, any economic impacts incurred due
to a CHD would necessarily be incurred by a species' listing. The
agency termed this the "functional equivalence theory."151 Because
FWS could not consider economic impacts in its listing decisions, 152
and because, under 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, CHDs had no appreciable
economic impacts beyond those attributable to listing,153 the agency

146. Taylor, supra note 19, at 362.
147. See supra Part 11(c).
148. GiffordPinchot,378 F.3d at 1063.
149. Id. at 1069.
150. Id.; 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009).
151. Fisher v. Salazar, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1369 (N.D. Fla. 2009); Cape
Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108,
127 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that "[f]unctional equivalence is the theory that the
designation of critical habitat serves a minimal additional function separate from
the listing.").
152. Listing decisions must be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available...." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006).
153. See Fisher,656 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
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did not conduct impact analyses to determine the costs or benefits of
designating critical habitat.154
In 2001, the Fifth Circuit invalidated 50 CFR § 402.02 in Sierra
Club v. US. Fish & Wildlife Service, thereby rejecting the agency's
rationale for not designating unoccupied habitat for the gulf
sturgeon.' 55 The agency argued that the habitat was unnecessary for
the sturgeon's survival, per 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.156 In 2004, the Ninth
Circuit came to the same conclusion in Gifford Pinchot v. U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Service, finding that reliance on the regulation led to
FWS's failure to analyze the impact of proposed logging leases on
the Northern spotted owl's recovery within its CHD. 157 The court
held the regulation to be an impermissible interpretation of a statute
that defines critical habitat as including "the specific
areas.. .essential to the conservation [i.e., recovery] of the
species."
As Part VI discusses, the agency's failure to account for recovery
benefits of CHDs must also result in a judicial finding that exclusions
of critical habitat under § 4(b)(2) are procedurally invalid.15 Yet too
many courts have jettisoned a hard look analysis at FWS's decision
to exclude critical habitat under § 4(b)(2), inconsistent with its
intrusive level of review of the initial designations under § 4(b)(3).
Rectifying this deficit both in agency decision-making and
accountability in the courts has become a practical imperative after
the Tenth Circuit's misguided 2001 decision in New Mexico Cattle
Growers.

154. See, e.g., N.M. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The FWS stated in its economic analysis
that, because all actions 'that result in adverse modification of critical habitat will
also result in a jeopardy decision, designation of critical habitat for the flycatcher is
not expected to result in any incremental restrictions on agency activities."').
155. Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 444-45 (5th Cir.
2001).
156. Id.
157. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1069 (9th Cir. 2004).
158. Id. at 1070 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (2006)).
159. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d
1115, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that FWS "improperly ignored the recovery
goal of critical habitat" by finding "that there were no additional regulatory benefits
to be gained by designating critical habitat in areas that were ultimately excluded.")
(emphasis added).
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IV. NEWMEXICO CATTLE GROWERS THRUST ECONOMIC IMPACT
ANALYSES ONTO CENTER STAGE, AND PROVIDED A NEW RATIONALE
FOR EXCLUDING CRITICAL HABITAT
Many commentators have identified the beginning of the Bush
Administration in 2001 as the defining moment when FWS began
slashing critical habitat protections.160 While politics no doubt
influenced agency decision-making, it was the Tenth Circuit's ruling
in New Mexico Cattle Growers that gave the agency legal cover for
excluding vast swaths of critical habitat, largely on economic
grounds.
In 2001, the Tenth Circuit abolished the agency's baseline
approach for conducting § 4(b)(2) impact analyses, thereby
inadvertently handing FWS a new rationale for excluding critical
habitat. 161 By requiring FWS to expand its analysis to include
impacts attributable to listing, the court invited an administration
openly hostile to the ESA to publish the economic costs associated
with both listing species and CHDs. This decision, therefore,
undermined the plain language of the ESA that restricts economic
analyses to the effects of CHDs. 162
In New Mexico Cattle Growers, the plaintiff New Mexico Cattle
Growers Association sought to invalidate FWS's CHD for the
southwestern willow flycatcher, arguing that the agency failed to
conduct an economic impact analysis for the CHD. 163 Congress
amended the ESA in 1982 to include § 4(b)(2), which requires the
agency to take into account "the economic impact, the impact on

national security, and any other relevant impact" of designating

160. See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, FederalLand
and Resource PreservationManagement,3 PuB. NAT. RES. L. (2d Ed. 2010); Dan
Vergano, Survey: Science, Politics at Odds, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2005, at 9D,
availableat http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2005-02-09-fish-game-x.htm;
Natural Resources Defense Council, The Bush Record: EndangeredSpecies &
HabitatProtection,availableat http://www.nrdc.org/bushrecord/ wildlife- species
.asp (accessed on May 4, 2010).
161. See N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d
1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001).
162. Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 344 F. Supp.
2d 108, 130 (D.D.C. 2004).
163. N.M Cattle GrowersAss'n, 248 F.3d at 1280.
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critical habitat.164 The purpose was to provide some counterpoint to
the listing process, which is based solely on the best scientific data
available, to account for effects on land use and other development
interests. 165 After 1982, the agency used a baseline approach for its §
4(b)(2) analysis, whereby it placed all economic impacts not solely
attributable to the CHD below the baseline, leaving only impacts
resulting exclusively from the CHD above the baseline.166 Once
again, the agency argued that no economic impacts resulted only due
to its designation of critical habitat because, as discussed in Part
I(c)(ii), a CHD would add no additional protections beyond a listing
pursuant to 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.167 Therefore, there were no abovethe-baseline economic impacts.' 68
The court rejected the agency's rationale, finding that Congress
unambiguously intended for the agency to consider economic impacts
in CHDs.16 9 Because the plaintiffs did not challenge the agency's
regulation governing consultation for jeopardy and adverse
modification, however, the court did not invalidate the regulation
itself, as the courts did in Sierra Club and Gifford Pinchot.17 0
Instead, it reached a muddled compromise. The agency would need to
conduct a co-extensive economic analysis, which would consider
economic impacts of both listing a species and designating critical
habitat.171
The agency responded by considering "all conservation related
costs"- including those implicated by listing- in its economic impact
analyses. 172 This was despite opinions by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
164. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2006). Congress was responding to the outcry
following the Supreme Court's ruling in TVA. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), which
halted construction on the expensive and nearly complete Tellico Dam because the
area fell under a CHD for the endangered snail darter. The Court found that
regardless of the economic impact, Congress left no agency flexibility to weigh
species conservation against other values. Id. at 194.
165. H.R. REP. No. 97-567, PT.1, at 12 (1982).
166. N.M Cattle GrowersAss'n, 248 F.3d at 1280.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1283-84.
169. Id. at 1285.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1284-85.
172. See, e.g., Clarification of the Economic and Non-Economic Exclusions for
the Final Designation of Critical Habitat for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and
Eleven Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,279,
30,292 (May 31, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) ("In light of the
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shortly thereafter rejecting the Tenth Circuit's holding as inconsistent
with the ESA. 173 As a practical matter, revised CHDs based on coextensive impact analyses have led to stark reductions in CHDs for
many listed species. 174
V. FWS DRASTICALLY REDUCED CHDS FOR LISTED SPECIES
FOLLOWING NEW MEXICO CATTLE GROWERS

Pro-development groups responded to the Tenth Circuit's decision
by challenging CHDs nationwide, arguing that their economic impact
analyses to date had failed to consider co-extensive impacts. 175 if
FWS considered the full economic costs of both species listing and
CHDs, it might be less inclined to exclude more habitat under §
4(b)(2).' 7 6 After designating critical habitat essential for a species'
conservation and conducting an economic analysis, the Secretary
may determine that the benefits of excluding certain areas outweigh
the benefits of including them, so long as exclusion will not result in
the species' extinction. 177 I refer to this as Step 2 in the critical
habitat designation process. Unfortunately, New Mexico Cattle
Growers set up a collision course between § 4(b)(2)'s floor of
preventing extinction, and ESA's primary emphasis on achieving
species recovery.
After New Mexico Cattle Growers, the Bush Administration and
developers began using § 4(b)(2) as a means of drastically reducing
CHDs.178 Half the designations in 2001-2003 included exclusions
under the provision, compared with just five out of fifty-six from
1993-2001.179

uncertainty concerning the regulatory definition of adverse modification, our
current methodological approach to conducting economic analyses of our critical
habitat designations is to consider all conservation-related costs.").
173. See Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Kempthorne, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1013,
1032 (D. Ariz. 2008).
174. See infra Part IV.
175. See, e.g., Peter Uimonen & Jack Kostyack, UnsoundEconomics: The Bush
Administration'sNew Strategyfor Undermining the EndangeredSpecies Act,
NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, (June 2004), at 11-12 available at http://www.nwf.org/
nwfwebadmin/binaryVault/Unsound%2OEconomics.pdf.
176. See id. at 13-14.
177. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2006).
178. See Uimonen & Kostyack, supranote 175, at 7.
179. Id.
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FWS responded to New Mexico Cattle Growers by either seeking a
voluntary remand and vacatur of challenged CHDs, or by settling
with pro-development challengers.s In any event, the agency's
reevaluation of its CHDs based on a more robust economic analysis
usually resulted in reduced habitat designations for many listed
species, including the Mexican spotted owl, 18 1 northern spotted
owl,1 82 arroyo toad,183 San Diego fairy shrimp,184 bull trout, 18 5 and
red-legged frog.186 This article analyzes these particular cases
because they involve species with CHDs prior to New Mexico Cattle
Growers, but whose CHIDs were revised after the Tenth Circuit's
ruling.
FWS clarified the connection between the Tenth Circuit's
decision and its reevaluations. Before reducing the red-legged frog's
CHD by 90%, an Interior Department official stated that it settled
with the Home Builders Association in response to the ruling, noting
that, "Fish and Wildlife agrees that a more robust economic analysis
is required."18 7 Indeed, the share of acres reduced due to economic
180. For example, in 2003, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service reached a settlement
with the American Forest Resource Council to conduct a new economic impact
analysis in line with the New Mexico Cattle Growers decision. Proposed Revised
Designation of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalls
caurina), 73 Fed. Reg. 29,471, 29,473 (proposed May 21, 2008) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
181. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (D.
Ariz. 2003).
182. In 2008, FWS cut the northern spotted owl's critical habitat by 1.6 million
acres, or 24 percent, to 5.3 million acres. Revised Designation of Critical Habitat
for the Northern Spotted Owl, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,325, 47,326 (Aug. 13, 2008) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
183. Mike Ferullo, Endangered Species: Fish and Wildlife Service Slashes
Habitatfor California Toad Species, Citing Costs, 38 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 828 (Apr.
22, 2005).
184. The shrimp's habitat was reduced from roughly 15,000 acres in 1997 to
6,000 acres in 2003. Determination of Endangered Status for the San Diego Fairy
Shrimp, 62 Fed. Reg. 4925 (Feb. 3, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17);
Designation of Critical Habitat for the San Diego Fairy Shrimp (Branchinecta
sandiegonensis), 68 Fed. Reg. 19,887, 19,888 (proposed Apr. 22, 2003) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
185. Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,212,
56,212 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
186. Revised Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog (Rana aurora
draytonii), 73 Fed. Reg. 53,492, 52,492 (proposed Sept. 16, 2008) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
187. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 16.
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impacts grew dramatically between 2001 and 2003, rising from 0.3%
in 2001, to 8.9% in 2002, to 69% in 2003.188 There are, as usual,
exceptions to the rule. Interestingly, the species at issue in New
Mexico Cattle Growers, the southwestern willow flycatcher, gained
138 river miles of habitat protection in the agency's revised 2005

CHD.189
As discussed in Part II, the red-legged frog gained protections after
a court rejected FWS's argument in 1996 that designating critical
habitat was "not prudent."l 90 That holding resulted in a CHD of 4.1
million acres. 191 A decade later, the frog was not so lucky. The
Home Builders Association challenged the designation immediately
after New Mexico Cattle Growers, asserting the agency conducted an
inadequate economic impact analysis. 192 In its final 2001 rulemaking,
FWS concluded, not unusually, that "no significant economic impacts
are expected from critical habitat designation above and beyond that
already imposed by listing the California red-legged frog."193 "We
believe that any project that would adversely modify or destroy
critical habitat would also jeopardize the continued existence of the

species."

94

In 2006, after conducting a new, co-extensive economic analysis
consistent with New Mexico Cattle Growers, FWS cut the red-legged
frog's CHD from 4.1 million acres to 450,000 acres, excluding,
188. Uimonen and Kostyack, supra note 175, at 8.
189. The agency designated 599 river miles in 1997 and 737 miles in 2005. Final
Determination of Critical Habitat for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed.
Reg. 39,129, 39,129 (July 22, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17);
Designation of Critical Habitat for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher
(Empidonax traillii extimus), 70 Fed. Reg. 60,886, 60,886 (Oct. 19, 2005) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). That said, the agency expanded the breadth of the
designation, adding habitat in the states of Colorado, Nevada, and Utah in 2005, to
the states also impacted in 1997: Arizona, California, and New Mexico. Id. In
addition, the agency admitted that the 1997 designation resulted from a rushed
process compelled by a court order, and therefore "the Service was not able to
provide the level of analysis and completeness that it has in the past on such rules."
Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62
Fed. Reg. 39,129, 39,130 (July 22, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
190. See supra Part II.
191. See Kay, supra note 16.
192. See id.
193. Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the California Red-legged Frog,
66 Fed. Reg. 14,625, 14,656 (Mar. 13, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
194. Id. (emphasis added).
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among other things, all unoccupied land because it was not essential
to the frog's survival.195 FWS excluded more than 250,000 acres
based on the revised economic analysis alone,' 96 citing co-extensive
economic costs totaling nearly $396 million for nineteen designated
tracts as the reason for the exclusion.197 The agency further indicated
that economics, and not scientific evidence, motivated the exclusions,
conceding that the "decrease in residential housing development [on
those nineteen tracts] would directly translate into a potential benefit
to the subspecies that would result from this designation."l98 In other
words, the exclusion was not due to new scientific data questioning
the conservation benefits of the designated tracts, but to newly
considered economic factors.
Similarly, in revising the CHDs downward for the bull trout and
arroyo toad, the agency noted high economic costs.199 After
conducting a co-extensive economic analysis for the agency's
proposed bull trout CHD in June 2004,200 FWS cut the designation by
75% in 2005, based almost entirely on new cost projections. 20 1 The
agency published costs between $200 million and $300 million for
ranchers and utility companies, noting that excluding critical habitat
on this basis would not imperil the bull trout's survival.2 02 FWS also
excluded 98% of the critical habitat for the arroyo toad.2 03 After the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted
FWS's request for a voluntary remand and vacatur of its original
195. Bob Egelko, Feds Sued Over Millions ofAcres for 13 Species, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 20, 2007, at B 1; Center for Biological Diversity, Saving the CaliforniaRedLegged
Frog,
available
at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/amphibians/California redlegged frog/.
196. Designation of Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog, and
Special Rule Exemption Associated With Final Listing for Existing Routine
Ranching Activities, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,244, 19,282-83 (Apr. 13, 2006) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
197. Id.

198. Id. at 19,283.
199. Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,212
(Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
200. Proposed Designation of Critical Habitat for the Jarbidge River, CoastalPuget Sound, and Saint Mary-Belly River Populations of Bull Trout, 69 Fed. Reg.
35,768 (proposed June 25, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
201. Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70 Fed. Reg. at 56,212.
202. Wilson, supra note 17.
203. Ferullo, supra note 183.
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CHD for the toad in 2002 to comply with New Mexico Cattle
Growers,204 the agency conducted a new analysis in 2005 revealing
co-extensive costs of $1.5 billion over twenty years - an alarming
figure that invited a pro-development backlash. 205 The agency
206
In
attributed 90% of those costs to curbed real estate development.
response, the agency cut the toad's CHD in 2005 by 125,000 acres to
11,695 acres, basing the reduction of 68,000 acres "solely on
economic considerations." 207
Finally, in 2008, the agency reduced the northern spotted owl's
208
critical habitat by 1.6 million acres, or 24%, to 5.3 million acres.
The reduction resulted from a 2003 settlement with the American
Forest Resource Council, among other groups, requiring FWS to
revise its economic impact analysis. 209 Once again, New Mexico
Cattle Growers took center stage, and it was reported that "the
administration's decision to seek a settlement was based on [the
Tenth Circuit's] decision finding that federal agencies had not
properly considered the economic impacts of designating critical
habitat." 210
The agency's justifications for the exclusions reflect an abuse of
discretion in their continuous reliance on 50 C.F.R. § 402.02's
conflation of the survival and recovery standards. In the case of the
red-legged frog, after citing the high costs of designating habitat,
FWS then noted that the benefit of CHDs was limited because all
nineteen excluded tracts were occupied by the frog, meaning they
protections through jeopardy
would receive comparable
2 11
fact
that this conclusion wrongly
Aside from the
consultations.
assumes that both jeopardy and adverse modification consultations
204. Bldg. Indus. Legal Def. Found. v. Norton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 100, 101-02
(D.D.C. 2002).
205. Ferullo, supra note 183.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 73
Fed. Reg. 47,325, 47,326 (Aug. 13, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
209. Proposed Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted
Owl (Strix occidentalls caurina), 73 Fed. Reg. 29,471, 29,473 (proposed May 21,
2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
210. Les Blumenthal, Bush Toppling ForestSafeguards, Critics Say: The Settling
of Suits Will Kill Protections in the Northwest Plan, They Charge, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 30, 2002 at Al.

211. See Ferullo, supra note 183.
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determine impacts only to a species' survival,2 12 it raises another
question. If excluding those lands would drastically reduce economic
costs by allowing for greater development in frog habitat, how could
the agency simultaneously claim that remaining jeopardy
consultations would provide nearly identical protections?
One possible answer is that the agency did not need to square this
circle. Under § 4(b)(2), the FWS may exclude lands based on the
impact analysis so long as the species does not face extinction213 - in
other words, so long as the exclusion does not impact the species'
survival. As FWS acknowledged, newly revealed economic costs
tipped the balance from favoring species conservation to preventing
extinctions.214 The agency therefore found a back-door means under
Step 2 of defining CHD consultations in terms of survival instead of
recovery even while acknowledging that the Gifford Pinchot and
Sierra Club courts invalidated such an interpretation of the ESA.
In short, FWS's adoption of co-extensive economic analyses has
resulted in the opposite of Congress' intent "that under the ESA the
balance of hardships always tips sharply in favor of endangered or
threatened species."215

212. See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d
1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d
434, 444-45 (5th Cir. 2001).
213. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2006).
214. Designation of Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog, and
Special Rule Exemption Associated with Final Listing for Existing Routine
Ranching Activities, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,244 (Apr. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17); Cf Final Designation of Critical Habitat for the Arroyo Toad (Bufo
californicus), 70 Fed. Reg. 19,562, 19,596 (Apr. 13, 2005) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17) (conceding that the costs and other impacts cited in the economic
analysis "may not be avoided by excluding the area, due to the fact that the areas in
question are currently occupied by the arroyo toad and there will be requirements
for consultation under Section 7 of the Act...")
215. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1996).
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VI. FWS USES

CO-EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSES TO
EXAGGERATE COSTS, UNDERESTIMATE BENEFITS, AND JUSTIFY
ALTERNATIVE PROTECTION SCHEMES AS SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVES
FOR PROMOTING SPECIES RECOVERY

A. The Agency Exceeds Its Discretionby FocusingOn Costs Of
CriticalHabitatAnd Minimizing Economic And Non-Economic
Benefits
Since the courts in Sierra Club and Gifford Pinchot compelled
FWS to consider CHDs in terms of species recovery rather than
survival, the agency has acknowledged benefits of CHDs in its final
rulemakings.2 1 6 But critical habitat exclusions have continued to rise
under § 4(b)(2) for two reasons. First, FWS routinely fails to fully
consider economic and non-economic benefits relative to costs,
instead citing three boilerplate benefits of designating critical habitat:
educational benefits, benefits derived from adverse modification
consultations that would not also trigger jeopardy consultations, and
circumstances where additional protections under other regulatory
mechanisms are triggered by a designation. 217 Second, the coextensive economic impact analysis mandated by New Mexico Cattle
Growers has resulted in exaggerated costs. As John Kostyack of the
National Wildlife Federation correctly predicted in 2003, the rewrite
of CHDs to be consistent with New Mexico Cattle Growers "will
ultimately lead to smaller areas covered by the critical habitat
designations, as the Services begin to use the ESA [§] 4(b)(2)
exclusion authority in unprecedented ways."2 18
Critical habitat designations for the red-legged frog, bull trout, and
arroyo toad that were developed after New Mexico Cattle Growers
illustrate how the agency undervalues benefits and exaggerates costs.
After conservation organizations sued FWS for failing to consider
economic benefits and broader social values in eliminating 90% of
the red-legged frog's critical habitat, the agency relented and

216. See, e.g., Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70 Fed. Reg.
56,212, 56,240 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
217. Id.
218. CriticalHabitatDesignations Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the S. Comm. on Env't
and Pub. Works, 108th Cong. 64 (2003) (statement by John Kostyack, Senior
Counsel, National Wildlife Federation).
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reevaluated the CHD. Yet the agency's proposed 2008 designation
restored the frog's CHD to only 1.8 million acres - far short of the
original 4.1 million acres proposed pre-New Mexico Cattle
Growers.220 On March 17, 2010, the agency settled on a final
designation of slightly more than 1.6 million acres, or a 61%
reduction compared to the original designation. 22 1 This was in large
part due to a revised economic impact analysis, which again focused
almost exclusively on costs. In soliciting public comment on its 2008
§ 4(b)(2) analysis, sixteen of the agency's twenty questions
concerned whether the agency had underestimated costs. Only four
included any mention of potential benefits - economic or noneconomic - that the agency might consider. 222 Moreover, the
analysis itself cited only economic costs, including impacts to: (1)
residential and commercial development; (2) water management; (3)
agriculture; (4) ranching and grazing; (5) timber harvest; (6)
transportation; (7) fire management; (8) utility and oil and gas
pipeline construction and maintenance; and (9) habitat and vegetation
management. 223
In addition to a cost-biased focus, the agency considered costs
associated both with listing and designating habitat in its co-extensive
analysis.2 24 This had a distortionary effect. Not only was the cost
estimate exaggerated - in this case $510 million to $1.34 billion over

219. A 2007 inspectors general report found that FWS-head Julie MacDonald
had routinely excised scientific data supporting broader CHDs. She resigned her
position in 2007. See Memorandum from Earl. E. Devaney, Inspector General,
Dep't of the Interior, to Dirk Kempthorne, U.S. Secretary of the Interior, available
at
http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/Endangered%20Species%20FIN
AL%20REDACTED5%20wTOCencryption.pdf.
220. Revised Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog (Rana aurora
draytonii), 73 Fed. Reg. 53,492 (proposed Sept. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17).
221. Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog,
75 Fed. Reg. 12,816 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
222. Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog
(Rana aurora draytonii), 74 Fed. Reg. 51,825, 51,825-26 (proposed Oct. 8, 2009)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
223. Id. at 51,827.
224. See Uimonen & Kostyack, supra note 175, at 17.
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twenty years225 - but it included those costs solely attributable to
listing protections, which may not be considered in deciding whether
to exclude critical habitat.2 26
FWS's impact analysis was similarly flawed for the bull trout,
arroyo toad, and combined habitat designation for fifteen vernal pool
species. In the case of the bull trout, the agency cited up to $300
million in development costs but failed to include estimates by its
own economist of $200 million to $215 million in potential economic
benefits derived from preserving the trout's habitat. 227 Similarly,
while citing enormous costs for protecting the arroyo toad, the
agency did not consider water quality protections and subsequent
improvements in public health that would likely result from the
CHD,228 nor did it account for the premium homeowners would pay
to locate near protected open space. 229 Finally, with its 2003 revised
CHD for fifteen vernal pool species, FWS reduced the designated
critical habitat by 60%, citing co-extensive costs of approximately
$1.4 billion over twenty years.230 Besides considering costs
associated with listing protections that are irrelevant to a CHD, the
agency used questionable methods to estimate broader real estate
market impacts, sometimes double-counting previous costs estimated
by the Army Corps of Engineers § 404 permitting under the Clean
Water Act .231 The resulting cost estimate therefore not only differed
from the 2002 draft estimate of $130 million over twenty years - it
was more than ten times greater. 232
A cost-biased impact analysis constitutes an abuse of agency
discretion under the APA. Contrary to the White House Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines and ESA's clear
command that FWS consider all impacts of a CHD, the agency
routinely excludes from its analyses non-economic social benefits,
such as recreation, cultural and historic values, and preserving

225. Id. Confusingly, the agency now refers to the co-extensive analysis as the
baseline analysis, and the formerly termed baseline analysis as an incremental cost
analysis.
226. Id.
227. Wilson, supra note 17.
228. Ferullo, supra note 183.
229. Wilson, supra note 17, at Al.
230. Uimonen & Kostyack, supra note 175, at 17.
231. Id. at 18.
232. Id. at 17-18.
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genetic and scientific resources, as well as other economically
significant benefits, like watershed protection, erosion control,
climate and air quality control. 233
B. FWS Underestimates The Benefits Of CriticalHabitat To Justify
Reliance On Alternative Protection Schemes Like HCPs And PreExisting Regulations
FWS does consistently consider three benefits of CHDs:
educational opportunities, benefits to the species derived from
adverse modification consultations that do not also trigger jeopardy
consultations, and circumstances where additional protections under
other regulatory regimes are triggered by a designation. 2 34 But these
are offered up as straw men, acknowledged for the purpose of
satisfying Sierra Club and Gifford Pinchot's requirement that FWS
consider recovery goals, but easily dismissed for providing few
additional benefits beyond listing. Having disabused anyone of the
notion that such CHD benefits are, in fact, substantial, the agency
then shifts gears and cites alternative conservation mechanisms generally HCPs and pre-existing regulations - to justify excluding
large tracts of critical habitat, particularly on private lands. 2 35
The agency's reasons for favoring HCPs over CHDs are not
without merit. HCPs and other voluntary, adaptive management
programs may provide species protections while also bringing
collaborative flexibility to a contentious and divisive law. 236 Indeed,
233. The Office of Management & Budget (OMB) developed guidelines for
conducting economic analyses in response to an executive order in 1996 and
congressional legislation in 2003. The OMB requires direct the agency to consider
both quantifiable and non-quantifiable costs and benefits. "When there are
important non-quantified monetary values at stake, you should also identify them in
your analysis so policymakers can compare them with monetary benefits and
costs." OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR
A-4,
REGULATORY
ANALYSIS
3
(2006),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a4.pdf.
234. See, e.g., Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout 70 Fed. Reg.
56,212, 56,240 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
235. In 2003, then-Assistant Interior Secretary Manson acknowledged an
expansion of the use of the exclusion provision, stating, "[w]e in this
Administration have been looking at [this exclusion provision] quite a bit more
robustly than has been done in the past." See Jehl, supra note 16, at A 18.
236. See, e.g., Craig R. Allen, Panarchy, Adaptive Management and
Governance: Policy Optionsfor Building Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1036, 1040
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many analysts have noted the theoretical advantages of collaborative
HCPs in fostering agreements between FWS, private property
owners, and other regulated entities to manage development on land
occupied by listed species.2 3 7 But as Martin Nie recently observed,
collaborative plans cannot supplant robust regulatory enforcement,
and are actually dependent on them. 2 38 HCPs may be acceptable
conservation alternatives but only against the "backdrop of regulatory
coercion making HCPs look relatively attractive to private
landowners." 2 39 The threat of the "hammer" of regulatory
enforcement - in this case, maximal CHDs - is important to
developing stronger HCPs. 2 40
For both legal and policy reasons, I would go one step further in
asserting that CHDs should remain the default course of action, rather
than a backstop against weak voluntary mechanisms.
1. Congress Requires That FWS Designate Critical Habitat
The ESA requires that the agency both designate critical habitat
241
While
and implement recovery plans, which may include HCPs.
the agency has discretion to exclude critical habitat under § 4(b)(2)
based on its impact analysis, this does not equate to unbounded
authority to effectively vitiate this statutory obligation.2 4 2 Indeed,
Congress erected a "conservation firewall" between CHDs and
recovery plans. 243 That is, Congress viewed the two as distinct rather
than alternative means toward reaching the same end. For example,
while CHDs trigger the more rigorous CHD adverse habitat
modification consultation analysis, HCPs activate only less protective
jeopardy consultations.24 4 As the Ninth Circuit held in Gifford
(2009); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation By Adaptive Management - Is it Possible?, 7 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21, 42-46 (2005); Lynn Scarlett, The Endangered Species Act
and Landowner Incentives, A.L.I. 139, 143-45 (2009).
237. Ruhl, supra note 236, at 45-46, n.70.
238. Martin Nie, The UnderappreciatedRole of Regulatory Enforcement in
Natural Res. Conservation,41 POLICY SCIENCES 139, 148 (2008).
239. Id. at 150.
240. Id. at 151.
241. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3), (f)(1) (2006).
242. See, e.g., David A. Paulson, No Endangered Species Left Behind:
Correcting the Inequity in Critical Habitat designationfor Pre-1978-Amendment
Listed Species, 25 U. HAW. L. REv. 525, 537 (2003).
243. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
244. Id.
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Pinchot, "[the agency] cannot rely on a conservation program that
has the same goal as critical habitat to change the boundaries of the
spotted owl's critical habitat."24 This would amount to doing at Step
2 (determining what lands to exclude from a CHD) what the Ninth
Circuit rejected doing at Step 1 (failing to designate critical
habitat).2 4 6
Moreover, legislative history supports a statutory interpretation that
limits FWS's discretion to replace CHDs with HCPs. In 2003, in a
move to weaken CHDs and promote voluntary "cooperative
conservation" programs, the U.S. House of Representatives
considered the Critical Habitat Reform Act which would have banned
CHDs in areas where HCPs existed. 247 Former FWS head Jamie
Rappaport Clark testified that replacing CHDs with HCPs was a
recipe for more species extinction. "[It] not only fails to improve the
conservation of habitat under the Endangered Species Act, it would
actually make the situation worse by effectively eliminating any
protection for much if not most of the habitat endangered and
threatened species need to recover." 24 8 If FWS already had statutory
authority to exclude CHDs based on the existence of HCPs, the need
to codify that into law would seem redundant and the campaign by
conservationists to defeat the bill moot. 249
Third, excluding land based on alternative protections is a suspect
interpretation of the agency's own regulation, which permits
exclusions based on the "probable economic and other impacts of the
designation upon proposed or ongoing activities." 250 The exclusion
analysis should thus follow directly from the § 4(b)(2) impact
analysis. Indeed, the agency acknowledges as much in its CHD
rulemakings, stating in its bull trout designation, for example, that
"information [from the economic impact analysis] is intended to
245. 378 F.3d at 1076.
246. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1127
(9th Cir. 1997).
247. Ronny Millen, Christopher L. Burdett, Critical Habitat in the Balance:
Science, Economics, and Other Relevant Factors, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 227,
228 (2005).
248. Id. at 229 (citing Hearing on H.R. 2933 Before the H. Comm. on Resources,
108th Cong. 9 (April 28, 2004), at 73-74 (statement of Jamie Rappaport Clark,
Executive Vice President, Defenders of Wildlife)).
249. One could, however, argue that the bill's import derived from the fact that it
made a discretionary decision to supplant CHDs with HCPs a mandatory one.
250. 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (2009).
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assist the Secretary in making decisions about whether the benefits of
excluding particular areas.. . outweigh the benefits of including those
areas in the designation., 2 5 1 Yet FWS has instead used § 4(b)(2) to
supplant CHDs with alternative conservation mechanisms.
Admittedly this is a weaker argument, since the agency's rule does
not prohibitconsideration of other factors in weighing the benefits of
exclusion versus inclusion. 252 FWS could thus make a strong
argument that its policy of excluding land based on the existence or
development of HCPs is a reasonable interpretation of its own
regulation.2 5 3
2. Replacing CHDs With HCPs Is A Suspect Policy
Excluding habitat on the basis of alternative protections is also
suspect policy for three reasons: (1) voluntary conservation
programs, like HCPs, are subject to less rigorous consultation
standards; (2) HCPs are oftentimes based on bad science; and (3)
HCPs' legitimacy as superior conservation mechanisms is
undermined by the agency's failure to fully consider benefits of
CHDs.
First, an HCP may not jeopardize the continued existence of a
species, but it also need not contribute to its recovery, thus raising
questions of whether HCPs really provide comparable protections. 254
Second, HCPs are too often based on bad science, and have a mixed
track record of success.255 Many HCP recovery plans purporting to
protect multiple species contain significant information gaps that
compromise suitable conservation or mitigation efforts.2 56
In
251. Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout 70 Fed. Reg. 56,212,
56,260 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
252. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(2) (2006).
253. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
150-51 (1991) (stating that "[b]ecause applying an agency's regulation to complex
or changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and
policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret
its own regulations is a component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers.").
254. Matthew E. Rahn, Holly Doremus & James Diffendorfer, Species Coverage
in Multispecies Habitat Conservation Plans: Where's the Science?, 56
BIOSCIENCE 613, 614 (July 2006).
255. Id. at 616
256. Id.; Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons From a Study
in Maladaptive Management. 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 298 (2007) (noting that
"[m]onitoring of HCP compliance is usually deficient, if not entirely absent, and
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addition, the process for including species in an HCP is weak, with
many species added without an adequate scientific basis. On average,
41% of all covered species in the plans were never actually
confirmed in the planning area.25 7
Inadequate procedures were showcased in the case of two of the
vernal pool species considered in Bartel, the San Diego and Riverside
fairy shrimp. In 2006, a district court found the agency's HCP for the
species wholly inadequate.2 5 8 FWS authorized § 10 ITPs on land
essential to the species' conservation, combined with "ersatz
mitigation measures," exclusion of adaptive management provisions
to adjust for changes in the species' conservation needs, and failure to
evaluate the potential impact of its conservation plan.2 5 9
Third, replacing CHDs with HCPs is bad policy because of serious
procedural flaws in how the agency conducts its § 4(b)(2) analyses.
As was discussed in Part V(a), FWS consistently underestimates the
benefits of CHDs while relying on spotty scientific data in
developing recovery plans, 26 0 thus begging the question whether
HCPs are actually superior. If the agency is so confident that HCPs
are better at promoting recovery, why undermine its own legitimacy
by failing to fully consider the benefits of including critical habitat?
The agency's CHDs for the red-legged frog and bull trout beg this
question. FWS wrote extensively on the benefits of cooperative
conservation programs over CHDs for the red-legged frog, touting its
"private-sector efforts through the Department of the Interior's
that
and noting
philosophy,"
Conservation
Cooperative
"[c]onservation agreements with non-Federal landowners (HCPs,
safe harbor agreements, other conservation agreements, easements,
and state and local regulations) enhance species conservation by
extending species protections beyond those available through [§]

subsequent adaptation of HCPs to integrate new information or changed
circumstances acquired during implementation is even rarer.").
257. Id. at 617. This is troubling because HCPs, by definition, permit
development on some pieces of land in exchange for preserving others. Id. Unless
the species is evenly distributed throughout the recovery area, then poor data on a
species' location could threaten its survival - let alone recovery - if it largely or
exclusively inhabits a specific tract slated for development.
258. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp 2d 1118, 1123 (S.D.
Cal. 2006).
259. Id. at 1123, 1139, 1144.
260. See supra Part V(a).
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7(a)(2) consultations." 2 61 The agency continued by noting the
benefits of partnerships with landowners and voluntary conservation
commitments. 262 Similarly, in explaining habitat exclusions for the
bull trout, the agency noted that "[t]here are tools (e.g., HCPs) that
can encourage or require habitat restoration or improvement and
other positive steps to help move species closer to being recovered
[beyond CHDs] .263

There is legitimacy to this line of reasoning. Extensive
implementation of cooperative conservation initiatives in the 1990s
demonstrated that such programs have the potential to accomplish
many important conservation-related goals while reducing political
aversion to the ESA. 264 Perhaps most importantly, landowners are
more willing to share information about species on their land and to
commit to preserving certain areas if they are assured a "safe harbor"
from ESA bans on "taking" species under § 9.265 The argument goes
that the threat of CHDs and § 9 take prohibitions drive landowners to
preemptively develop, clear, or otherwise make their land
inhospitable to endangered species - a perverse incentive not-soaffectionately termed "shoot, shovel, and shut up." 266
In reality, however, it is overwhelmingly § 9 alone that (may)
create this incentive, not CHDs. The agency's assertion that HCPs
are a favored alternative to CHDs therefore requires some inventive
logic. CHDs are only triggered on private lands when there is some
federal nexus.267 Otherwise, private landowners have no obligation
to preserve habitat or protect species. Landowners are only subject to
land-use regulations through § 9's strict take prohibition, which itself
may be relaxed if the landowner implements a viable HCP under §
10.268 Therefore, it is unclear what problem FWS is trying to solve
261. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Critical Habitat
for the California Red-Legged Frog (Rana aurora draytonii) 73 Fed. Reg. 53,492,
53,516 (Sept. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
26 2. Id.
263. Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout 70 Fed. Reg. 56,212,
56,240 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
264. Id
265. Lynn Scarlett, Species Protection: Critical Legal Issues, The Endangered
Species Act and LandownerIncentives, ALI-ABA 139, 143-45 (Nov. 5-6, 2009).
266. Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets
the EndangeredSpecies Act. 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826-27 (1997).
267. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
268. Id. § 1539(a)(1) -(2).
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by replacing CHDs with HCPs. Why challenge the ESA's clear
statutory command that FWS both designate critical habitat and
implement conservation plans?
One explanation may be the inclusion of "no surprises" provisions
in HCPs and other cooperative conservation programs.2 69 Under such
agreements, the agency assures landowners that if they agree to
preserve parts of their land, then should a species inhabiting that land
later be listed as threatened or endangered, the landowner will not be
subject to additional regulations - such as CHDs. 270 The agency may
also want to minimize the psychological and political impact of
drawing a big red circle around private land designating critical
habitat. 27 1 But if these reasons explain why HCPs are preferred
alternatives to CHDs, then they are inconsistent with the agency's
proffered explanation for choosing HCPs over CHDs: that they
provide superior conservation benefits for listed species.27 2 If HCPs
provide better species protections, why should landowners fear CHDs
at all?
The most plausible rationalization of these apparent inconsistencies
is that HCPs do not actually achieve the ESA's conservation
objectives - at least, not as they are implemented. Realizing
cooperative conservation benefits depends on the availability of
273
thorough scientific data and rigorous oversight and enforcement.
So far, this has not been the case.2 74 The fact that cooperative
conservation initiatives have a spotty record of succeSS275 demands
that the agency implement rigorous procedures to ensure that any
uncertainty is resolved in favor of species conservation. The agency
269. Ruhl, supra note 237, at 47-49.
270. Id.

271. See, e.g., Clarification of the Economic and Non-Economic Exclusions for
the Final Designation of Critical Habitat for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and
Eleven Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,279,
30,284 (May 31, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (stating that "[B]y
excluding critical habitat for the listed species, we are enhancing our relationship
with these conservation partners and facilitating future conservation partnerships.").
272. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997);
Clarification of the Economic and Non-Economic Exclusions for the Final
Designation of Critical Habitat for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and Eleven
Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,279-01,
30,283 (May 31, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
273. See Rahn, et al., supra note 254, at 618.
274. Id. at 616-18.
275. See e.g., Taylor, supra note 19, at 364.
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must first study the full range of benefits afforded by a CHD before
explaining why HCPs provide superior benefits. In addition, the
agency must explain how HCPs can both provide superior (or even
comparable) conservation benefits while also saving millions of
dollars in economic costs otherwise incurred by CHDs. The agency
should bear the burden of demonstrating that HCPs are simply more
cost-effective, specialized means of achieving better species
conservation.
VII. CHARTING A PATH FORWARD: ENSURING THAT CRITICAL
HABITAT DESIGNATIONS PROMOTE SPECIES RECOVERY

A. JudicialReview Of CriticalHabitatDesignations
Courts should be just as willing to take a hard look at FWS's
procedural deficiencies in excluding habitat under § 4(b)(2) as they
are in analyzing "not prudent" or "not determinable" findings.
Congress' overwhelming conservation mandate that justified courts'
intrusive level of review under § 4(a)(3) is equally applicable under §
4(b)(2).27 As discussed in Part V, since New Mexico Cattle Growers,
FWS has excluded critical habitat based on flawed impact analyses
that courts should deem an abuse of discretion under the APA.2 77
First, the agency failed to adequately consider the economic and non278
economic benefits of CHDs under § 4(b)(2). Second, by excluding
critical habitat on the basis that species already enjoy alternative
protections at Step 2 under § 4(b)(2), the agency attempts to do
exactly what the Ninth Circuit rejected at Step 1 under § 4(a)(3). 279
Courts have heard challenges to critical habitat exclusions based on
allegations of inadequate § 4(b)(2) analyses on only a few occasions.
The three relevant cases are Home Builders Ass'n of Northern
Calfornia v. U.S. Fish & Wildlhfe Service280 and Center for

276. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125
n.5 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353
F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2003)).
277. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
278. See supra Part V(a).
279. The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997); 16 U.S.C. §§
1532(5)(A); 1533(b)(2) (2006).
280. No. CIV. S-05-0629 WBS-GGH, 2006 WL 3190518 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2006)
(holding that U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services impermissibly conflated survival and
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Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Management281 in 2006, and
Arizona Cattle Growers Ass'n v. Kempthorne28 2 in 2008. Other
challenges have settled out of court.2 83
These cases, all arising in the Ninth Circuit, reflect some level of
discord in courts' willingness to take a "hard look" at FWS's §
4(b)(2) impact analyses. None of the decisions review FWS's
analyses closely enough to ensure consistency with CHDs' primary
goal of species recovery.
First, in both Home Builders Ass'n and Bureau of Land
Management, the courts appropriately took a close look at the
agency's record to determine whether it actually considered recovery
benefits of CHDs beyond good faith assurances that it had done so.
The Arizona Cattle Growers court did not consider this question.284
The Home Builders Ass'n court struck down the agency's final CHD
excluding critical habitat for fifteen vernal pool species as arbitrary
and capricious because it impermissibly determined that jeopardy and
adverse modification consultations provided equal benefits - a
finding that was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Gifford Pinchot.285
recovery standards, and failed to adequately consider economic benefits in its §
4(b)(2) analysis.).
281. 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1143-44 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that mere
references to "conservation" in the CHD rule are insufficient evidence that the
agency implemented the ESA's recovery goal when the substance of the rule
essentially equates "jeopardy" and "adverse modification" determinations).
282. 534 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1035 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff'd Ariz. Cattle Growers v.
Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding reliance on co-extensive economic
impact analyses to be unlawful).
283. The agency designated 74,000 acres of critical habitat for the California
tiger salamander after the Center for Biological Diversity sued in 2008 to enjoin the
agency's reduction of critical habitat for the salamander by half in 2005. See
Designation of Critical Habitat for the Sonoma County Distinct Population
Segment of California Tiger Salamander, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,662 (Aug. 18, 2009) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); see also "Saving the California Tiger Salamander,"
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/amphibians/California tiger-salamande
r/index.html (last accessed Sept. 26, 2010). As part of a settlement agreement with
the American Forest Resources Council (AFRC), the agency proposed several
CHD exclusions under § 4(b)(2). Revised CriticalHabitatProposedfor Marbled
Murrelet, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE NEWS RELEASE (U.S. Fish & Wildlife

Service), July 30, 2008, at I availableat http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/
showNews.cfm?newsld=74ADIA28-D7Bl-74AB-E524Cl7C7AFC988C.
284. See 534 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (D. Ariz. 2008).
285. Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., No. CIV.
S-05-0629 WBS-GGH, 2006 WL 3190518, at *27 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2,2006).
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Empty assurances by the agency that recovery had been applied to its
286
reasoning consistent with Gifford Pinchot were inadequate.
Similarly, the Bureau of Land Management court looked beyond the
agency's assertion that it had considered the "conservation needs" of
the endangered milk-vetch in excluding critical habitat.287 The
agency defended its exclusion of two tracts of critical habitat on the
basis that the milk-vetch was already protected under § 7 federal
jeopardy consultations because they occupied these areas. 288 The
court deemed the CHD arbitrary and capricious for the same reason:
"references to 'conservation'. . . cannot be squared with the
reasoning ... which essentially equates the 'jeopardy' and 'adverse
modification' determinations to conclude that the regulatory benefits
of critical habitat designation in the excluded areas was
negligible."28 9
Second, in both Home Builders Ass'n and Bureau of Land
Management, the courts appropriately rejected FWS's impact
analyses by looking closely at whether the agency fully considered
economic benefits of critical habitat in determining that the benefits
of exclusion outweighed the benefits of inclusion.290 Again, the
Arizona Cattle Growers court did not consider this question. 291 The
issue was not, however, clear-cut. Indeed, the district court in Home
Builders Ass'n at first affirmed the agency's incomplete consideration
of economic benefits in justifying habitat exclusions.2 9 2 Upon
reconsideration, it reversed this finding. 293 The court acknowledged
that it could not consistently hold that FWS failed to follow Gifford
Pinchot by not considering recovery benefits while simultaneously
concluding that its failure to consider economic benefits of recovery
in its § 4(b)(2) analysis was permissible. 294 On remand, the court

286. Id.
287. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d
1115, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
288. Id. at 1145.
289. Id. at 1146.
290. Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S05-0629 WBS-GGH, 2007 WL 201248, *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007).
291. See Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 534 F.
Supp. 2d 1013 (D. Ariz. 2008).
292. Home Builders Ass'n ofN. Cal., 2006 WL 3190518, at *27.
293. Home Builders Ass'n, 2007 WL 201248, at *3.
294. Id.
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ordered FWS to "adequately consider the recovery benefits of critical
habitat designation in designating its exclusions." 295
Similarly, the Bureau of Land Management court found the agency
impermissibly failed to consider the public cost savings from closing
off areas to off-highway vehicle (OHV) use.296 FWS considered only
the costs in lost surplus value from projected lower visitation rates by
OHV users. 297 The court injected itself into the agency's decisionmaking process, finding the agency abused its discretion by
considering only boilerplate benefits of inclusion - regulatory and
educational benefits from designating 52,780 acres of critical
habitat.29 8 "By only analyzing the loss of revenue and jobs associated
with closures, and failing to analyze the concomitant public cost
savings" associated with not having to provide additional
infrastructure as well as law enforcement and emergency services, the
agency "provided an unbalanced assessment of the 'economic impact
and any other relevant impact of specifying any particular areas as
critical habitat."' 299 The court also quickly disposed of the agency's
argument that it could not accurately include those cost savings
because specific data indicating the extent of the savings was
unavailable.300 Just as courts have held that "best scientific data
available" under § 4(a)(3) does not mean perfect scientific data for
purposes of designating critical habitat, 30 1 the Bureau of Land
Management court appropriately did not absolve the agency of its
duty to consider economic benefits in the face of imperfect, if robust,
economic information. 302
The court went further in its analysis. Beyond finding the agency's
failure to fully consider economic benefits arbitrary and capricious, it
closely analyzed the agency's methodology used to calculate costs. 3 03
295. Id.
296. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d
1115, 1153-54 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
297. Id. at 1147.
298. Id. at 1153; see supra PartV(b).
299. Id. at 1153 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2006)).
300. Bureau ofLand Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
301. See, e.g., N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 628-29 (W.D. Wash
1991) (noting "[t]hat the Thomas Committee was working to develop conservation
strategies for the spotted owl did not relieve the Service of its obligation under the
ESA to designate critical habitat to the maximum extent determinable.")
302. Bureau ofLand Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
303. Id. at 1148.
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The court determined that the analysis concluding a 15% decline in
OHV visitation was flawed.3 0 4 BLM based its projection on land
closures in 2001 that correlated with a 24% decline in visits. 305 The
15% estimated decline for a similar closure was based on the 2001
data, which when adjusted for confounding factors in 2001, may have
exacerbated the decline in that year.306
While acknowledging that the agency's reasoning appeared sound
on its face, the court rejected the finding for three reasons: (1) the
BLM itself concluded that the 2001 closures likely had a minimal
impact on OHV visitation; 30 7 (2) the economic analysis
acknowledged that BLM lacked accurate pre-2002 visitation data; 3 08
and (3) the analysis unreasonably concluded that the closures led to a
15% decline in visitation in each year from 2001 to 2004, even
though the 2003 data showed an increase from 2001.309 In short, the
court took it upon itself to question the methodology and assumptions
made in the agency's economic analysis. Far from deferring broadly
to agency expertise, the court determined for itself whether it
believed the agency's reasoning and conclusion made sense - not just
that the agency's conclusion could, by some estimation, be rational.
This is a similar exercise of judicial review as seen in courts'
consistent determination that FWS had supplied insufficient evidence
for the court to ratify a "not prudent" finding. 310
In both cases, on these two points, the courts took a "hard look" to
determine if the agency's assertion that it considered species recovery
was supported by the evidence in the record.3 11 Moreover, it is
important to remember that the agency's exclusions were based on an
illegal regulation that conflated jeopardy and adverse modification

304. Id.

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1148-49.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1997); Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1090-91 (D. Ariz.
2009); The Jumping Frog Case, No. C 99-01461, 1999 WL 1244149, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
311. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
27 (1983).
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analyses. 3 12 Courts should be weary of granting agencies deference
for any actions based on an illegal rule - even when the agency
professes to do otherwise. Indeed, the burden is squarely on the
agency to put forth evidence to counter the "presumption of
regularity" that the agency has followed its own rule. 3 13
Unfortunately, the courts limited the effect of their own check on
agency discretion by (a) allowing FWS's continued use of coextensive economic analyses, 314 (b) affirming FWS's procedurally
and substantively incomplete non-economic impact analyses, 315 and
(c) permitting FWS to exclude critical habitat on the basis of
alternative protections. 316
1. Arizona Cattle Growers, Bureau ofLand Mgmt, And Home

Builders Ass'n Got It Half Right In Their Review Of The Agency's
Use Of Co-Extensive Economic Analyses
In considering whether FWS could exclude critical habitat under §
4(b)(2) based on a co-extensive, rather than a baseline, economic
analysis, the courts got the law partly correct. Importantly, just as the
courts looked to Congress' overriding charge that critical habitat
promote conservation where "not prudent," "not determinable," or
"alternative protections" was the defense, the three courts here
appropriately couched their rulings in the ESA's overriding purpose
of promoting species conservation.3 1 7
312. See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 378 F.3d 1059,
1073-74 (9th Cir. 2004).
313. Id. at 1074 (affirming the "presumption of regularity" that an agency
follows its own regulation unless it provides evidence to the contrary).
314. Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 534 F. Supp.
2d 1013, 1035-36 (D. Ariz. 2008); Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S-05-0629, 2007 WL 201248, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24,
2007); Ctr.for BiologicalDiversity, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (acknowledging that a
co-extensive economic analysis undercuts critical habitat protections, but not going
so far as rejecting it).
315. See Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV.
S-05-0629, 2006 WL 3190518, at *29 (Nov. 2, 2006 E.D. Ceal.) (citing Admin. R.
Vol. 2 at 17021468); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F.
Supp. 2d 1115, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
316. Home Builders Ass'n, 2006 WL 3190518, at *29.
317. 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b) (2002). In creating the ESA, "Congress started from the
finding that '[t]he two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of
natural habitat.' " TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93307, p. 2 (1973), reprintedin 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2289, 2290).
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In Arizona Cattle Growers', the court found that a co-extensive
economic analysis was unlawful, in part because "an expansive
interpretation of 'economic impacts' is contradictory to the overall
purpose of the ESA, which speaks only to conservation, without
regard to costs or other economic considerations." 3 18 The court
rejected outright FWS's reliance on a co-extensive analysis in
making exclusions for the Mexican spotted owl.3 19 FWS's
methodology goes "beyond the command of the ESA by examining
impacts that exist independent of the critical habitat designation." 320
It was therefore inconsistent with Gifford Pinchot, which rejected the
agency's rule that gave rise to the co-extensive economic analysis.321
Affirming the ruling, the Ninth Circuit in 2010 reiterated that the
"practical relevance of the economic analysis. .is to determine the
benefits of excluding or including an area in the [CHD].
Incorporating costs not associated with the designation undercuts that
analysis "by incorporating in the analysis costs that will exist
regardless of the decision made." 323 The court went further, noting
that regardless of § 4(b)(2)'s deferential language, the agency
remains bound by ESA's primary insistence on designating critical
habitat to promote species recovery - a task which is more accurately

In addition, Congress passed the ESA with the stated purpose "'to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved,' and 'to provide a program for the conservation of such .
species. . . .' Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)).
318. Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (emphasis added)
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). The district courts have not come to a satisfactory
conclusion regarding the permissibility of using a co-extensive economic impact
analysis. In Fisher v. Salazar, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1371, 1372-73 (N.D. Fla.
2009), a pro-development group challenged FWS's use of a baseline economic
analysis, out-of-step with New Mexico Cattle Growers. The court confusingly
stated that "[t]o the extent the Tenth Circuit's co-extensive approach permits
consideration of costs not attributable to the designation, it is inconsistent with the
mandate of the ESA." It also held that FWS's use of the baseline economic impact
analysis was not arbitrary and capricious because it did "identify costs that would
not be attributable to the designation," in line with New Mexico Cattle Growers.
319. Ariz. Cattle Growers', 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
320. Id.
321. See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d
1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004).
322. Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1173 (9th Cir.
2010).
323. Id.
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reflected by a baseline approach. 3 24 "[I]f there is no net benefit. . .to
excluding the area, the agency must designate it." 325 Similarly, the
Bureau of Land Management court noted that the co-extensive
analysis "undercut[s] the importance of critical habitat." 326
Of the three decisions, the Home Builders Ass'n court got the
analysis least correct. It upheld the co-extensive analysis, even after
acknowledging that it was legally flawed.32 7 The court punted,
finding that while other courts had invalidated the co-extensive
analysis as impermissibly considering economic impacts associated
with species listing, 32 8 Gifford Pinchot neutralized that concern:
"[After Gifford Pinchot], an agency is no longer prevented from
engaging in a meaningful analysis of the economic impact of a
[CHD], above and beyond the impact of listing a species, "329 and it
therefore did "not require the conclusion that a co-extensive analysis
is legally improper."30 The court missed the point. The objective of
the economic analysis is not simply to consider costs and benefits
associated with CHDs, but to consider only those costs solely
attributable to CHDs, which was the Ninth Circuit's concern in
Gifford Pinchot.3 3 ' As the Arizona Cattle Growers' court found, in
sharp contrast, "the inclusion of co-extensive costs implicitly violates
the ESA's disallowance of consideration of economic factors at the
time of listing." 332

324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d
1115, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
327. Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S05-0629, 2007 WL 201248, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007).
328. See, e.g., Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 534
F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1035 (D. Ariz. 2008); Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 130 (D.D.C. 2004).
329. Home Builders Ass'n, 2007 WL 201248, at *5 (emphasis added).
330. Id.
331. See United States v. Weed, 389 F.3d 1060, 1070 (10th Cir. 2004).
332. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1070 (9th Cir. 2004).The Ninth Circuit has yet to resolve the district court splits.
Considering that several courts have found that Giford Pinchot, by revitalizing the
recovery standard, fundamentally undermined the rationale for the Tenth Circuits'
ruling in New Mexico Cattle Growers, it is appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to
consider a case involving a co-extensive economic analysis dispute, and find it to
be arbitrary and capricious. This would, at least, restore order to the district courts.
See Ariz. Cattle Growers', 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1034; Home Builders Ass'n, 2007
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Unfortunately, all three courts refused to strike down the coextensive methodology itself, even though Gifford Pinchot and Sierra
Club rejected the New Mexico Cattle Growers' decision that spurred
the methodology in the first place. 3 33 The regulation's persistence is
more bizarre considering that the Gifford Pinchot and Sierra Club
rulings, by requiring FWS to consider the unique recovery aspects of
CHDs, destroyed the rationale for the Tenth Circuit's decision. 334 if
the agency must consider a CHD's impact above and beyond
ensuring a species' survival, then a baseline economic analysis that
looks only at the impacts of the CHD is necessarily infused with
relevance - the Tenth Circuit's original concern.
That three courts failed to reject outright a co-extensive analysiseven while referencing the Cape Hatteras D.C. district court, which
did 33 5 - is troubling both legally and practically. The Arizona Cattle
Growers' court implicitly addressed the issue, though arrived at a
dubious conclusion. The court found somewhat inconsistently that
conducting a co-extensive analysis is fine, so long as the agency uses
the analysis to determine where the baseline is, rather than relying on
it to determine whether to exclude critical habitat.33 6 But the reason
the agency gave for conducting a co-extensive analysis at all was to
be in compliance with New Mexico Cattle Growers, not as an
alternative means of implementing the baseline approach. A court
cannot supply a reasoned basis for an agency's decision the agency
has not itself offered, simply to comport the agency's action with the
law.33 7 Moreover, the court's unelaborated reasoning makes little
sense anyway. How can lumping costs attributable to species listing
and CHDs help the agency determine what costs result solely from
CHDs?
Finally, the practical effect of upholding the co-extensive economic
analysis, which necessarily reveals higher costs than a baseline

WL 201248, at * 5; Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 422 F. Supp. at 1152-53 (N.D.
Cal. 2006.); Cape Hatteras,344 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
333. Id.; Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 444-45 (5th
Cir. 2001).
334. See id
335. Cape Hatteras,344 F. Supp. 2d at 129-30.
336. Ariz. Cattle Growers',534 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36.
337. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
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analysis, 338 invites lawsuits by developers who point to astronomical
costs as proof that CHDs aren't justified. 33 As seen with the
agency's rejection of CHDs for the red-legged frog, bull trout, and
arroyo toad, publishing the costs at all, regardless of whether the
agency relies on them, often compels the agency to strike a balance
that favors excluding habitat and preventing extinction, rather than
including habitat and promoting conservation. 340 While Arizona
Cattle Growers' and Bureau of Land Management correctly found
that FWS may not rely on co-extensive analyses in determining
whether to exclude land, permitting such analyses has resulted in the
opposite of Congress' determination "that under the ESA the balance
of hardships always tips sharply in favor of endangered or threatened
species." 341
2. Home Builders Ass'n And Bureau ofLand Management Should
Have Required That The Agency Consider Non-Economic Benefits
The Home Builders Ass'n and Bureau of Land Management courts
rightly refused to grant deference to FWS's failure to fully consider
economic benefits. 34 2 Yet the former court wrongly affirmed the
agency's incomplete consideration of non-economic benefits. 34 3 In
Home Builders Ass'n, the agency argued that considering such
benefits "would duplicate the codification of the societal value of
protecting species by Congress in enacting the ESA." 344 Said another
way:
338. See supra Part III.
339. "While largely ignored for nearly twenty years following their enactment, . .
[the agency's economic analyses] have recently been the focus of numerous
successful lawsuits brought by industry groups challenging the economic analyses
accompanying critical habitat designations." See Senatore, supra note 16, at 453.
340. Designation of Critical Habitat for the California Red-Legged Frog, and
Special Rule Exemption Associated With Final Listing for Existing Routine
Ranching Activities, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,244, 19,282-83 (Apr. 13, 2006) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70
Fed. Reg. 56,212 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Ferullo,
supra note 183.
341. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1996).
342. Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S05-0629, 2007 WL 201248, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1153-54 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
343. See Home Builders Ass', 2007 WL 201248, at *29-30.
344. Id. at *29 (citing Admin. R. vol. 2 at 17021468).
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[w]hile [§] 4(b)(2) of the Act gives the Secretary discretion
to exclude certain areas from the final designation, she is
authorized to do so only if an exclusion does not result in
the extinction of the species. Thus, we believe that explicit
consideration of broader social values for the species and
its habitat, beyond economic impacts, is evidenced by the
designation itself. .
In other words, FWS argued that excluding habitat previously
designated presupposes that the benefits of including such habitat
were already considered in the designation concurrent with the
species listing under § 4(a)(3).
However, this does not comport with the ESA. Indeed, the
argument impermissibly reads out of § 4(b)(2) the explicit
requirement that the agency weigh both the benefits of exclusion and
the benefits of inclusion together. It also fails to account for §
4(b)(2)'s clear mandate that the agency shall "take into
consideration.. .any other relevant impact of specifying any
particular areas as critical habitat." 346 If considering economic
impacts translates into a non-discretionary duty to consider both
economic costs and benefits, how can the agency consistently have
discretion to ignore non-economic benefits in an analysis of other
relevant impacts?
The Bureau of Land Management court, on the other hand, did not
reach the legal question of whether FWS may refuse to consider noneconomic benefits. The agency was within its discretion, the court
held, to determine that land uses that qualify as non-economic
benefits - hiking, backpacking, camping, wildlife viewing,
birdwatching, and photography - were so minimal that they were not
significant.3 4 7 The court left open the question of whether the agency
is obligated to consider non-economic benefits that are significant. 348

345. Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,212,
56,221 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (emphasis added).
346. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2006).
347. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d
1115, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
348. See id
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3. The Home Builders Ass 'n Court Should Not Have Upheld The
Agency's Exclusion Of Habitat Based On Alternative Protections
The Home Builders Ass 'n court erroneously concluded that the
agency could permissibly exclude lands at Step 2 under § 4(b)(2) on
the basis that other conservation plans - generally HCPs - provide

But the Ninth Circuit rejected this
alternative protections. 349
350
maneuver at Step 1 under § 4(a)(3) on three separate occasions.
The Home Builders Ass'n court, however, found it permissible to do
the same thing at Step 2 under § 4(b)(2), pursuant to the impact
analysis. 35 1 The court reasoned that the provision's deferential
language "permits the FWS to conduct a discretionary analysis of
exclusions... [t]hus, the Environmental Groups have not cited any
authority that would preclude the FWS from considering the
existence of other management schemes in deciding whether to
exclude land from its critical habitat designation." 352
Yet the court's laissez-faire approach to exclusions is undermined
by other opinions. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.
Department of the Interior, for example, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California rejected the agency's
attempt to use its motion to vacate a CHD as a vehicle for its
alternative protections argument. The agency claimed that a vacatur
of CHDs for the fairy shrimp and gnatcatcher would do no harm to
the species because alternative protections already existed. The court
rejected this reasoning, opining that "[tihis debate is a transparent
rehash of the government's previously rejected arguments against
originally designating these critical habitats." 353
Finally, Congress included HCPs in the ESA not as an alternative
to CHDs, but to protect species on private lands, which are less likely

349. 2006 WL 3190518 at * 30. The court was satisfied that "FWS explained its
exclusion of lands subject to HCPs based on its determination that the benefits of
exclusion outweighed the benefits of inclusion, and the species would not become
extinct as a result." Id. Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., No. CIV. S-05-0629, 2006 WL 3190518 at *30 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
350. The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997); Ctr.for Biological
Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (D. Ariz. 2003); Natural Res. Def.
Council v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1153 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
351. Home Builders Ass'n, 2006 WL 3190518 at *29.
352. Id.
353. Natural Res. Def Council, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
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to be protected under a CHD.35354 The HCP framework reflects a
delicate balance. As noted previously, under § 10, a landowner may
apply for an ITP, allowing for the sacrifice of a certain number of
members of a specific species,3 5 5 contingent on preparing a detailed
HCP specifying how the applicant will "minimize and mitigate" harm
to protected species. 3 56 In other words, HCPs fulfill the ESA's
conservation objectives where CHDs cannot. The emphasis was still,
however, on making species recovery the overriding objective consistent with the primary purpose of the ESA.3 57 Despite the
voluntary nature of such cooperative conservation agreements,
Congress still "expected FWS to comply with the broad conservation
goals of the ESA."35 8
4. Results Matter: CHDs For The Mexican Spotted Owl, Peirson's
Milk-Vetch, & Fifteen Vernal Pool Species Following Court Orders
The courts' partial rejections of FWS's impact analyses for failing
to include recovery goals has resulted in either reduced or unchanged
CHDs. In the cases of the vernal pool species 35 9 and the Peirson's
milk-vetch,3 6 0 the agency based its decisions to exclude critical
habitat on economic costs and alternative protections. In its February
14, 2008, final designation, FWS reduced the milk-vetch's critical
habitat by approximately 9,800 acres from the previous 22,000 acres
designated, noting "disproportionate
economic and social
impacts."361 The agency similarly maintained its exclusion of one

354. As discussed in Part I, supra, § 7 consultation requirements are triggered
pursuant to a CHD on public land, and are only triggered on private land where the
proposed activity involves a federal permit or some other federal nexus. See 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2006).
355. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
356. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
357. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
358. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1145
(S.D. Cal. 2006).
359. Clarification of the Economic and Non-Economic Exclusions for the Final
Designation of Critical Habitat for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and Eleven
Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,279, 30,283
(May 31, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
360. Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for Astragalus magdalenae var.
peirsonii (Peirson's Milk-Vetch), 73 Fed. Reg. 8748 (Feb. 14, 2008) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
36 1. Id.
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million acres of critical habitat for the vernal pool species, based
again on the rationale that HCPs provide adequate, if not superior,
protections. 362 There is no pending proposal to revise the Mexican
spotted owl's CHD since the Arizona Cattle Growers court's ruling
in 2006.
The agency's downward revisions to its final CHDs reflects FWS's
ongoing reluctance to fully flesh out benefits associated with critical
habitat, and highlights the importance of rigorous judicial review
over agency procedures. FWS disregarded the Bureau of Land
Management court's requirement that FWS consider the economic
benefits of CHD designations. Instead, FWS recited its boilerplate
generic benefits: 3 63 educational benefits and benefits derived from
adverse modification consultations that would not also trigger
jeopardy consultations. 364 Indeed, FWS minimized the importance of
even these limited "benefits" in a discussion of their shortcomings
vis-d-vis voluntary HCPs.365 Moreover, while FWS discussed the
costs associated with reduced OHV use to justify its exclusion of
9,000 acres for the milk-vetch, it failed, once again, to quantify
economic benefits in direct contravention of the court's order in
Bureau of Land Management.366 Finally, in an unexplained reversal
of its remanded CHD, the agency discussed non-economic costs due
to lost recreational opportunities, besides OHV use.367 In Court,
however, the agency defended not considering the recreational
benefits of including the excluded areas because recreational
activities beyond OHV use were so minimal. 36 8 The agency offered
no explanation for the inconsistency. The imbalanced weighing of
non-economic costs and benefits is, unfortunately, consistent with the
court's opinion in Home Builders Ass 'n - the only one of the three
362. Clarification of the Economic and Non-Economic Exclusions for the Final
Designation of Critical Habitat for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and Eleven
Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 72 Fed. Reg. at 30,283.
363. See supra Part V(a).
364. Clarification of the Economic and Non-Economic Exclusions for the Final
Designation of Critical Habitat for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and Eleven
Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,279.
365. Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for Astragalus magdalenae var.
peirsonii (Peirson's Milk-Vetch), 73 Fed. Reg. 8748, 8771-72.
366. Id. at 8773.
367. Id.
368. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d
1115, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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courts to rule directly on whether the agency must consider noneconomic benefits. 369 In its revised May 31, 2007 final CHD
following the court's remand, the agency considered neither
economic nor non-economic benefits beyond its oft-repeated
"boilerplate" benefits for the fifteen vernal pool species. 3 70 Indeed,
the agency's only substantive revision was to explicitly state that its
unaltered decision to exclude one million acres was now based on
consideration of CHDs' unique recovery benefits in line with Gifford
Pinchot.37 1 And the recovery benefits, the agency determined, were
better achieved through HCPs than CHDs. On July 31, 2007, the
court dismissed the case, finding FWS's revisions satisfactory, and
thus overlooking FWS's semantic sleight of hand. 372 The court
seemed to forget that, in the controversy's previous iteration, it
rejected such empty assurances by the agency that it had considered
recovery objectives.3 73
In all three cases, judicial review ultimately took a back seat to
agency discretion. Where the agency did not violate the court's
order, it took full advantage of the court's deference. The results
were therefore not entirely surprising: no additional critical habitat.
While § 4(b)(2), as noted, grants the agency more discretion than §
4(a)(3), it does not absolve the agency of its responsibility to
rigorously examine CHDs' economic and non-economic costs and
benefits. Nor does it hamstring the courts from striking down an
exclusion justified by alternative protections, such as HCPs, that fail
to fully consider the benefits of a CHD. Just as courts in The Fairy
Shrimp Case and The Gnatcatcher Case, among others, reviewed

"not prudent" findings under an intrusive "hard look" review
standard, courts should do the same in examining whether the agency
has made a rational connection between a thoroughly conducted
impact analysis (not done here) and a decision to exclude critical

369. Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S05-0629 WBS-GGH, 2006 WL 3190518 at *29-30 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
370. Clarification of the Economic and Non-Economic Exclusions for the Final
Designation of Critical Habitat for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and Eleven
Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,279, 30,281
(May 31, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
371. Id. at 30,282.
372. Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S05-0629 WBS-GGH, 2007 WL 201248, *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007).
373. Id. at *28.
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habitat. Just as those courts cabined the intrusiveness of their review
in TVA v. Hill's holding that "the balance has been struck in favor of
affording endangered species the highest of priorities,"374 that same
charge should guide a review of § 4(b)(2) exclusions. 375
Opponents of limiting agency discretion argue that, under §
4(b)(2), Congress delegated greater discretion to the agency than
under § 4(a)(3), which includes the non-discretionary command that
the agency "shall. . .designate [critical habitat]." 37 6 Nevertheless,
even the agency concedes in its CHDs that the impact analysis forms
the basis for weighing benefits of exclusion over inclusion. And even
under a highly deferential standard, the agency must still demonstrate
a rational connection between an informed analysis and any
exclusion. 377 Requiring FWS to implement procedures that rigorously
analyze all economic and non-economic benefits of CHDs is not
inconsistent with the agency's discretion under § 4(b)(2). Indeed, §
4(b)(2) demands it.
Considering that the revised CHDs for the red-legged frog, bull
trout, arroyo toad, various vernal pool species, among others, all
justify excluding habitat on the basis of existing HCPs, ensuring that
recovery objectives are met demands a searching judicial review
standard of CHD exclusions.
B. Agency & CongressionalReforms To Promote Species Recovery
FWS's aggressive use of § 4(b)(2)'s exclusion provision raises
serious questions of legitimacy. HCPs may serve useful recovery
purposes, but their apparent value is belied by the agency's
procedural inadequacies in analyzing the costs and benefits of
CHDs. 378 Such institutional shortcomings also result in costly
lawsuits and sometimes court orders requiring new CHDs, 379
374. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
375. Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1059-60
(9th Cir. 2003) (finding that where Congress passed legislation with a clear intent, a
court must give that intent its full effect as a matter of law).
376. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
377. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the agency must "articulate a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.").
378. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 17, at Al; Kay, supra note 16, at Al.
379. Senatore, supra note 16, at 465 (commenting that "[fjollowing the willow
flycatcher and pygmy-owl decisions [both in 2001], additional lawsuits were filed
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triggering even more administrative costs associated with notice and
comment rulemaking. 380
As, noted, scientific studies tracking species recovery indicate that
CHDs are important to species conservation. 3 81 Species with critical
habitat for two or more years are more likely to improve and less
likely to decline than species without critical habitat. 382 Recovery
plans, by contrast, have yielded poorer results; only two percent of
FWS-administered species achieved greater than 75% of recovery
objectives under such plans. 383
Both Congress and FWS should ensure that (a) the agency is
fulfilling Congress' charge of ensuring species' recovery through
CHDs, (b) its CHDs are, as much as possible, lawsuit-proof, and (c)
that it minimizes political acrimony regarding the ESA. These goals
can be achieved through three mechanisms. First, the agency should
complete new rulemaking to address the Fifth and Ninth Circuit's
orders which invalidated its § 7 consultation rule. 3 84 Second, the
agency should consider economic and non-economic benefits in its §
4(b)(2) analyses. Third, the agency should end it back-door method
of excluding critical habitat under § 4(b)(2) on the basis of alternative
protections.
A new rule governing § 7 consultations for adverse modification
would save administrative costs, promote regularity and predictability
with stakeholders, and give CHDs the full force that Congress
intended.38 5 Currently, the agency operates in a muddled middle,
attempting to reconcile the New Mexico Cattle Growers decision on
the one hand, and Gifford Pinchot and Sierra Club on the other. As a
result, FWS wastes time and money conducting two economic
analyses: a co-extensive analysis to comply with New Mexico Cattle
Growers and a baseline analysis to comply with Gifford Pinchot and
challenging critical habitat designations on similar grounds for many other
species.").
380. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
381. Taylor, supra note 19, at 360-62.
382. Id. at 362.
383. See id
384. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1070 (9th Cir. 2004).
Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 444-45 (5th Cir. 2001).
385. See, e.g., The Gnatcatcher Case, 113 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997); Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F.Supp.2d 1090 (D. Ariz. 2003); N. Spotted
Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 626-27 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
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Sierra Club. A new rule codifying the agency's adverse modification
consultations in terms of recovery only would clarify the benefits of
CHDs beyond species survival, trigger a meaningful economic
analysis above the "baseline," and eliminate the New Mexico Cattle
Growers rationale for conducting costly and time-consuming coextensive economic analyses.
Abolishing the co-extensive analysis would also soften the
alarming cost estimates that the agency published after 2001, which
intensified demands by pro-development groups to reduce CHDs
across the board. Finally, a new consultations rule would likely
reduce expensive litigation over CHD designations, thereby directing
more agency resources toward species conservation.
1. Crafting A New Consultation Rule
A new rule could take various forms. It might simply remove the
two words "survival and" from the current version, so that it defines
changes to critical habitat as those that appreciably diminish "the
value of critical habitat for the recovery of a listed species." This
would bring the regulation into accord with the governing statute,
which prevents federal actions that adversely impact conservation of

a listed species.386
In addition, any new rulemaking should "fill the space" in the
statute's discretionary language under § 4(b)(2). For one, it should
make explicit that any impact analysis must consider both economic
and non-economic costs and benefits - and only those above the
baseline. The rule should prescribe a non-exhaustive list of factors
that the agency shall consider, such as the impact of a CHD on
watershed integrity, erosion control, climate and air quality, and
property values. This is critical to ensuring that the agency's
discretion to exclude critical habitat is less subject to the vicissitudes
of politics. Without this provision, the agency could continue
arguing that, while CHDs offer educational benefits and more
searching § 7 consultations, that these are either irrelevant or
redundant. Educational benefits, for example, are imputed to listing
itself, and it is likely that any federal action triggering an adverse

386. See, e.g., GiffordPinchot, 378 F.3d at 1070.
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modification consultation would thus also trigger a jeopardy
* - 387
consultation on this basis.
2. Legislative Reform: Unlikely But Needed
Congress could also amend § 4(b)(2) in a way that would strike a
better balance between conservation and development interests,
without undermining the ESA's core recovery objective. A statutory
command has the advantage of providing more permanence and
predictability than an agency regulation, which can be changed
relatively easily with each administration. Admittedly, it would be
much more difficult to pass such controversial legislation compared
with rewriting the agency's rule since sixty votes are now required to
pass most legislation of consequence in the U.S. Senate.
Assuming that Congress could summon the political will and rise
to the challenge, conservation interests would benefit from two
amendments. First, Congress could include a clause specifying that
all impacts of CHDs must be considered - both costs and benefits of
economic and non-economic consequences. Second, the clause
should clearly state that any exclusions shall be based on the impact
analysis only. This would avoid the agency's current practice of
justifying exclusions based on its development of voluntary
cooperative conservation strategies.3 8 8
Landowners would also benefit from a separate statutory provision
permitting the agency to implement cooperative conservation
y
programs in lieu of CHDs, but with significant caveats.3 8 9
have
compromise must keep Congress' core intent intact: that species
every opportunity for recovery and ultimate delisting. 390 Currently,
HCPs are site-specific, and tailored to assist a specific population of a
species. 39 1 CHDs, by contrast, focus on long-term conservation by

387. See, e.g., Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70 Fed. Reg.
56,212, 56,239-40 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
388. See supra Part V(b).
389. Alternatively, the agency could author the same text as a regulation
interpreting § 4(b)(2), and would likely get deference due to the section's grant of
broad discretionary authority to the agency. Congressional action is, however,
preferable because it is not subject to the changing politics of different
administrations.
390. GifordPinchot,378 F.3d at 1070.
391. See supra Part I.
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"preserv[ing] options for a species' eventual recovery."39 CHDs,
while not sufficient, therefore have the added benefit of encouraging
long-term species viability by promoting genetic diversity and
preserving more of the species' natural range. 393
The amendment must therefore require that any CHD substitutes
satisfy the goal of ensuring long-term species recovery, beyond sitespecific projects. It should specify, for purposes of judicial review,
that the agency has the clear burden of proving that it has
exhaustively considered the benefits of CHDs, and yet has still
determined that the benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of
inclusion. In addition, the agency must provide robust scientific
evidence that the HCP will achieve conservation objectives for both
ecosystem functionality and the species itself. It must also commit
resources to monitoring. Finally, the rule should include a "fail safe"
mechanism that would be tripped in two situations. For argument's
sake, if in ten years the listed species shows few or no signs of
recovery, or if Congress fails to appropriate sufficient funding for
monitoring and enforcement, then an expanded CHD will
immediately go into effect, covering the impacted area.3 94 Such a
trigger could have an important preemptive action-forcing effect.
Landowners would have an incentive to agree to strong conservation
programs at the outset. The current system, whereby landowners are
assured of "no regulatory surprises" if they agree to voluntarily
conserve portions of their land, provides the opposite incentive. 3 95
Ultimately, this strategy would better balance the interests of
conservationists and landowners alike, reduce costly litigation from
all sides, and ensure that the ESA's core habitat conservation
objective is validated.

392. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed.
Reg. 1796 (Jan. 15, 1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
393. See Taylor, supra note 19.
394. An expanded CHD may not solve the problem, since § 7 consultation
requirements are only triggered for projects with a federal nexus, but the threat of a
"big red circle" surrounding one's land could incentivize landowners to agree to
more conservation-oriented recovery programs at the outset.
395. See Ruhl, supra note 236, at 47-49.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit's decision in New Mexico Cattle Growers has
resulted in reduced CHDs for many listed species. The court's order
not only thwarted Congress' intent for the agency to consider
economic impacts attributable only to CHDs, but it also gave FWS a
new rationale for excluding critical habitat. Co-extensive economic
analyses that consider the impacts of both species listing and CHDs
reveal much higher costs than those attributable only to CHDs,
thereby inviting a backlash from pro-development groups. While
cost-benefit analyses themselves are not necessarily fatal to
meaningful CHDs, the agency's underestimation of benefits and
overestimation of costs has negatively impacted the ESA's core
conservation focus. By minimizing the benefits of CHDs vis-h-vis the
protections afforded species through the listing process, the agency
has justified HCPs as superior conservation mechanisms. In its
current form, this is both bad law and bad policy. Studies show that
both CHDs and recovery plans, like HCPs, are necessary to achieve
species conservation. Moreover, Congress requires both recovery
plans and CHDs for listed species.
Courts should take a "hard look" at the agency's impact analyses
and its justifications for excluding critical habitat. Just as the courts
routinely struck down the agency's "not prudent," "not
determinable," and "redundant" rationales for not designating critical
habitat in the 1990s, they should remand critical habitat exclusions
that fail to fully consider benefits of CHDs. Because the designation
of critical habitat is "the principal means for conserving endangered
species," both the agency and the courts must ensure that fulfilling
CHDs' conservation objective is the top priority.

